Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works
1-1-2022

Optimizing Whistleblowing
Usha Rodrigues

Faculty Scholarship

OPTIMIZING WHISTLEBLOWING
Usha R. Rodrigues*
ABSTRACT

Whistleblowers have exposed misconduct in settings rangingfrom public health to
national security. Whistleblowing thus consistently plays a vital role in safeguarding
society. But how much whistleblowing is optimal? And how many meritless claims should
we tolerate to reach that optimum? Surprisingly, legislators and scholars have
overlooked these essential questions, a neglect that has resulted in undertheorized,
stab-in-the-dark whistleblower regimes, risking both
overdeterrence and
underdeterrence.

This Article confronts the question of optimal whistleblowing in the context of
financialfraud. Design choices, which play out along two axes, have profoundeffects on

the successful implementation of whistleblowingpolicy. One axis varies by end goal to
provide whistleblowers with positive monetary incentives or to make them whole with
antiretaliation protection. The other axis centers on the mechanism for achieving that
goal agency intermediationor a private cause of action in the courts.

The existence of three parallelfinancial-fraudwhistleblowing regimes presents a
unique opportunity to consider how different whistleblower policy approachesplay out
in the realworld. First, using original, hand-collecteddatasetsfrom these three regimes,
this Article gathersand analyzes datafrom courts and administrative agencies. Second,

it identifies structural whistleblower reforms rooted in the data. Finally, this Article
develops a new analyticalframework to help legislators and scholars design regimes to

betterprotect and incentivize optimal whistleblowing.
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INTRODUCTION

Pilot Karlene Petitt blew the whistle at Delta Airlines, reporting safety issues
including pilot fatigue and improper training.1 The airline responded not by addressing
her concerns but instead by referring her to a psychiatrist, who diagnosed her withbipolar
disorder, which prevented her from flying for two years.2 Subsequently, two other

1. Katherine Krems & Jason Zuckerman, DOL Judge Awards Airline Pilot $500,000 in Compensatory
Damages in AIR21
Whistleblower Retaliation Case, NAT'L L. REv.
(Jan. 6, 2021),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/dol-judge-awards-airline-pilot-500000-compensatory-damages-air21-wh
istleblower [http://perma.cc/4BJE-BMQK].
2.
Rules,

Andy Pasztor, FAA Chief Had Helped Delta RetaliateAgainst Whistleblower, Administrative Judge
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
27,
2020,
3:09
PM),

http://www.wsj.com/articles/faa-chief-helped-delta-retaliate-against-whistleblower-in-previous-role-administr
tive-judge-rules-11609085771?mod=searchresults_posl&page=I [http://penna.cc/52JY-RNE2]. The doctor
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psychiatrists found that she did not have the disorder after all and the first psychiatrist
retired after complaints surfaced alleging misconduct in his evaluations of other Delta
pilots.3 This story has a happy ending for Ms. Petitt; she filed an action claiming that she
had been retaliated against for blowing the whistle, and an administrative law judge
(AU) agreed, awarding her $500,000 in back pay and damages.4
In Ms. Petitt's case, it appears that the government provided well-deserved
protection to a meritorious whistleblower.5 Not all whistleblowers are so deserving.
Employers fear that whistleblower regimes can empower disgruntled employees seeking
revenge against innocent bosses, forcing them to defend against meritless accusations.
How can whistleblower regimes protect the Petitts of the world without also empowering
nuisance suits?
Because whistleblowing protections can be both a shield for the sincere
whistleblower and a sword for the vengeful ex-employee, two key questions arise. First,
how much whistleblowing is optimal? And second, what mechanism should the
government employ to sift the meritorious wheat from the vindictive chaff? In criminal
law, an analogue of this question is raised by Blackstone's famous ratio: "[B]etter that
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." 6 Translated into whistleblowing
terms, the question becomes, How many false reports is society willing to endure to
ensure that a meritorious claim is protected?
These questions cannot be answered definitively and this Article makes no claim
to do so but they implicate a weighing function that any sound whistleblowing policy
necessarily must address. This Article confronts these questions head on, examines the
data available by way of three different design schemes in a single subject-matter context
(financial fraud), and provides a structured framework for policymakers going forward.
The first contribution of this Article is to develop a framework for addressing these
fundamental questions that determine how to structure whistleblowing protection.

later surrendered his medical license in a settlement with state regulators after complaints into his handling over
Delta pilot examinations. Doc Who Called Delta Pilot "Bipolar" Surrenders Medical License, CHRISTINE
NEGRONI
(Nov.
13,
2020),
http://christinenegroni.com/doc-who-called-delta-pilot-bipolar-surrenders-medical-license/
[http://perma.cc/S5CF-CP4H].
3.

Pasztor, supra note 2; CHRISTINE NEGRONI, supra note 2.

4. Id. ("The ruling says that 'in this case, the squeaky wheel did not get the grease."' (quoting Scott
Morris, Department of Labor administrative law judge)). The case has received extra attention because the head
of Delta at the time, Steve Dickson, later served as head of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). See id.
("The lengthy decision by a department administrative law judge concluded that Mr. Dickson, as Delta's senior
vice president of flight operations, knew about and approved punitive moves against veteran co-pilot Karlene
Petitt.").
5. Delta denies that any retaliation occurred and is appealing. See id. Whistleblowers regularly face
demotion, firing, and other punishments as a result of their reporting. Tanya M. Marcum & Jacob Young,
Blowing the Whistle in the Digital Age: Are You Really Anonymous? The Perils and Pitfalls ofAnonymity in
Whistleblowing Law, 17 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 1, 4 (2019) (discussing a study in which it was found that
nearly two thirds of whistleblowers had experienced some form of retaliation, including: 69% losing their jobs
or being forced to retire; 64% receiving negative employment performance evaluations; 68% having to work
more closely monitored by supervisors; 69% being criticized or avoided by coworkers; and 64% being
blacklisted from other jobs in their field).
6.

1769).

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (Oxford, Clarendon Press
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Section I explores these theoretical questions before turning to a survey of four basic
design choices, which can be grouped in pairs by type of claim. The first two provide
positive monetary rewards for whistleblowing.? The second two attempt to make a
whistleblower whole if she suffered from retaliation for her whistleblowing.8 These
pairings in turn vary by how they achieve their goal through a private cause of action
or a government agency as intermediary. 9
Design choices have profound effects on whistleblowing. An agency-based
approach forces the federal government to internalize more of the initial costs of
litigation.10 A whistleblower merely reports her tip or files her complaint, and the
government shoulders the rest of the work. A private cause of action allows the plaintiff
more control over the case but at a cost." Either the plaintiff herself pays court
expenses, or she must convince an attorney taking the case on contingency to do so. 12
Ultimately, whistleblowers inevitably face a gatekeeper: either a public agency or a
private lawyer determines whether a case goes forward.
It may be that granting a private cause of action spurs too many frivolous lawsuits,
and that an agency-centered approach best protects against the danger of unscrupulous
false whistleblowers. The converse could also be true. It could be that one benefit of the
court system is that it forces would-be plaintiffs or their attorneys to internalize the
cost of litigation, thus deterring more frivolous cases. In contrast, a disgruntled employee
can file a complaint with the government relatively easily, guaranteeing an investigation,
and thereby generating headaches for her employer. 13 A similar version of this
agency/private litigant question plays out in the whistleblower-reward (as opposed to
retaliation) context.
The second contribution of the Article is to provide the first empirical study of
available data regarding the relative success of three whistleblower protection
mechanisms in a defined field financial fraud-over an eight-year period.14 Until now,
scholars have ignored a legislative accident that created parallel whistleblower protection
regimes that use three distinct mechanisms to sort whistleblower claims in this arena.
Section II of this Article lays out these competing mechanisms. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200215 ("SOX") created an agency-based system situated in the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to protect whistleblowers who
allege financial fraud from retaliation. 16 In contrast, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform

7.

See infra PartI.C.

8.

See id.

9.

See infra Part I.E.

10. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. The Saibanes-Oxley Act of 2002 introduced such a
mechanism for financial fraud claims. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
11. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. The False Claims Act is the original template for this sorting
mechanism. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
12. See infra Part III.B.2. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 provides this form of whistleblower protection.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
13.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.

14.

See infra PartIII. C.

15.

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).

16.

Id.; see infra Part III.B.1.
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and Consumer Protection Act of 20107 ("Dodd-Frank") gives wronged whistleblowers
a private right of action in district court. 18 Thus, in Dodd-Frank, Congress chose the
courts, rather than an agency, to serve as the key decisionmaker for whistleblower
retaliation claims. Dodd-Frank also provided a separate, government-mediated
whistleblower bounty system at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
whereby whistleblowers can receive a percentage of the government's recovery if it is
over one million dollars. 19
Section III describes and analyzes data from these parallel whistleblower regimes.
There are key differences in coverage between the two protection regimes, but they are
closely related; indeed, many complaints voice claims under both statutes. 20 Despite
these variations, the data presented here constitute the best indeed, the only empirical
evidence on U.S. financial-fraud whistleblowing that now exists.
The data reveal that the agency mechanism results in relatively fewer successful
claims than does the private cause of action mechanism. Plaintiffs are roughly 60% more
likely to be successful under the litigation-focused sorting mechanism of Dodd-Frank
than the agency-focused mechanism of SOX.21 The third dataset, comprised of annual
data released by the SEC's Office of Whistleblower Protection (OWP), moves to the
bounty context, where whistleblowers seek not to be made whole for past retaliation but
rather to receive a monetary reward for reporting financial misconduct. 22 These
high-level data (again, the only ones available) suggest agency-mediated bounties
generate a tremendously high number of false positives i.e., meritless tips. The average
success rate for such tips is vanishingly small (0.33%).23
Taken at face value, it might appear that out of the three financial fraud reporting
mechanisms, Dodd-Frank is the "best" in terms of efficiency. But upon reflection, these
new data bring us ineluctably back to our first questions. Presuming that each mechanism
is accurate at assessing merit, the data show that granting a private cause of action
reduces the number of meritless claims the most. 24 Interviews with attorneys suggest that
it does so by causing whistleblowers (more often, plaintiffs' attorneys working on
contingency) to internalize the costs of litigation, and only to bring forward those cases
most likely to result in a high award. But those screened-out cases may contain reports
of misconduct that impact society profoundly each one potentially a missed
opportunity to divine misconduct.
In contrast, SOX antiretaliation claims, based as they are at OSHA, impose far
fewer costs on would-be claimants. All they need to do is file a form, which then launches
an investigation and makes findings. 25 Finally, SEC's bounty system requires still less

17.

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).

§ 7202(b);

see infra Part III.B.2.

18.

15 U.S.C.

19.

See infra note 86 and accompanying text.

20.

See, e.g., Wadlerv. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

21.

See infra Part IV.C Table 10.

22.

See 17 C.F.R.

23.

See infra Part IV.A; SEC, 2020 OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2020)

§ 240.21F-3(a)

[hereinafter SEC, 2020 ANNUAL
[http://perma.cc/3BVM-P4JU].

(2021).

REPORT],

http://www.sec.gov/files/2020%2OAnnual%2OReportO.pdf

24.

See infra Part IV.C Table 10 and accompanying text.

25.

See 18 U.S.C.

§ 1514A(b).
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effort a whistleblower reports to the OWP, lets the government do its work, and cashes
in if collections amount to over one million dollars. 26
The data tell us how these mechanisms are working and that the courts are likely
achieving their relatively high success rates by shifting screening costs to plaintiffs.
Armed with this insight, we must return to Section I's questions, which get to the
importance of the harm being reported and the tolerance we have for unworthy claims in
service of ferreting out and redressing this harm. Both the SEC and Congress have
ignored these questions in making whistleblower policy, as Section V makes plain.
Section V argues that it was a mistake from the outset for Congress to locate
complicated financial fraud questions at an agency focused on workplace safety.
Congress housed SOX whistleblowing at OSHA without any real thought except that
granting plaintiffs a private cause of action would encourage frivolous claims, 27 a fear
that the data suggest was ill-founded. This Article's third contribution is to recommend
that Congress consolidate federal financial-fraud reporting by moving responsibility for
SOX whistleblowing to the SEC. 28
Section V next turns to the SEC in its own right. The agency recently moved to
make smaller awards easier to obtain and proposed subjecting awards over one hundred
million dollars to additional review, in the name of efficiency. 29 As was the case with
legislative action in SOX, these reforms neglect to consider what efficiency means in the
context of whistleblowing. To evaluate a mechanism's efficiency, one must first
understand what goals one seeks to achieve.
The Article's fourth contribution thus comes full circle back to its first. Section V
articulates a two-stage framework for a more thoughtful analysis of whistleblowing
claims. The first stage focuses on assessing the nature of the underlying harm,
considering its severity, systemic implications, susceptibility to false claims, and the
salary level of the most likely reporters of misconduct. 30 The second stage focuses on
considering various levers Congress might use, starting with whether to positively
incentivize whistleblowing (through bounties) 31 or to protect whistleblowers from
retaliation. In particular, given the importance of attorneys to this process, Congress
needs to consider whether the incentives and protections for low-earning whistleblowers
32
are too low as a matter of policy, and as a matter of equity.

§ 240.21F-3(a)

26.

See 17 C.F.R.

27.

See infra note 292.

(2021).

28. See infra Part V.A.
29. Whistleblower Program Rules, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249 (proposed June 28,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/34-83557.pdf [http://perma.cc/L7JE-JHQK].

2018),

30.

See infra Part V.C.1.

31.

As Dodd-Frank did when it introduced a completely separate bounty mechanism at the behest of

Harry Markopolos, the unheeded external whistleblower in the Bernie Madoff fraud. See Oversight of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Failure To Identify the Bernard L. MadoffPonzi Scheme and How To
Improve SECPerformance,HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAffairs, 111th Cong.

(2009) [hereinafter Senate Hearing Statement of Harry Markopolos] (statement of Harry Markopolos).

32. See infra Part V.C.2.
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To make the application of this framework concrete, consider Boeing's 737 MAX.
A software error led to two plane crashes and grounded hundreds of planes.3 3 The loss
of hundreds of lives obviously was a severe harm, and the grounding of the planes had
systemic implications for the global economy. 34 What if an engineer making $60,000 a
year knew of the problem? Should Congress create a bounty to encourage the reporting
of this kind of misconduct in aviation? Is make-whole, antiretaliation protection
sufficient protection? Should an agency or a court provide redress? How many false
positives are we willing to tolerate rather than suffer the harm of a false negative that
is, a whistle unblown? These are the kinds of questions the proposed framework prompts
policymakers to think about in a systematic way.
I.

THEORIZING WHISTLEBLOWERS

This Section introduces the current theory and literature of whistleblowers. A
thorough survey of whistleblower literature would span fields including sociology,
accounting, finance, psychology, and law. I will not attempt that here. Instead, I begin
with a brief overview of whistleblower paradigms, 35 coupled with the vast amount that
must remain unknown about whistleblowing behavior. 36 Part I.C describes a question of
the relative merits of bounty systems, which positively incentivize whistleblowing,
versus antiretaliation systems, which merely protect whistleblowers who are punished
for their reporting. Part I.D describes experimental evidence on that question. Part I.E
examines literature on the relative merits of courts versus agencies in the bounty context.
A.

Whistleblower Paradigms

Society's view of whistleblowers is complicated, to say the least. 37 According to
one view, the whistleblower is a "rat," a "scoundrel" whose defining trait is disloyalty to
his or her organization. 38 Under this view, even whistleblowers reporting true
misconduct are worthy of scorn. They are "lowlife[s] who betray[] a sacred trust largely
for personal gain." 39

33. See Mariano Zafra, Robert Wall, Elliot Bentley & Merrill Sherman, Boeing MAX: A Tale of Two
Crashes, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2019, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/graphics/boeing-max-tale-of-two-crashes/
[http://perma.cc/G8YA-SBFP]; see also Boeing Grounds Entire 737 MAX CrashAircraft Fleet, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 14, 2019), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-47562727 [http://perma.cc/L98Y-3H69].
34. See Denise Lu, Allison McCann, Jin Wu & K.K. Rebecca Lai, From 8,600 Flightsto Zero: Grounding
the
Boeing
737
Max
8,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
13,
2019),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/11/world/boeing-737-max-which-airlines.html
[http://nyti.ms/3aZiKce] (reporting that the two crashes killed 346 people and grounded over 340 planes and an
estimated 8,600 flights per week).
35.

See infra Part I.A.

36.

See infra Part I.B.

37. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the
Implications ofthe Sarbanes-OxleyActfor Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1051-53 (2004).
38.

Id. at 1052.

39. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness ofRewards,
Liabilities, Duties, and Protectionsfor Reporting Illegality, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2010) (alteration in
original) (quoting TERANCE D. MIETHE, WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK: TOUGH CHOICES IN EXPOSING FRAUD,
WASTE, AND ABUSE ON THE JOB 12 (1999)).
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Sometimes these whistleblowers may not even be true whistleblowers at all that
is, they may not be reporting misconduct. Sometimes they have been fired for legitimate
reasons or let go as part of a broader layoff.40 In this model, the whistleblower is a
"disgruntled employee with an axe to grind." 4 1 These whistleblowers act because of a
grudge, to "get back at" their former employer.4 2
In contrast, the other paradigmatic whistleblower model is the hero, speaking a
lonely truth to protect the public from wrongdoing.4 3 "This paradigm usually pits the
conscience of one individual against the power and resources of a large organization." 44
Miriam Cherry sees the myth of the heroic whistleblower as representing American
individualism: "The individual worker, refusing to give up his or her morals and identity,
instead stands up for what he or she believes is right in the face of overwhelming power
and pressure to conform." 4 5
A third possibility is the employee who sincerely blows the whistle but is mistaken
either as to the underlying misconduct or as to the possibility of legal remedy.4 6 In the
case of mistaken whistleblowers, the primary problem is one of failure to understand the
law completely, a gap that employers presumably have an incentive to remedy.4 7 The
solution in this third category is not one of recalibrating incentives, but some form of
education or communication.4 8
A fourth consideration is that would-be whistleblowers themselves can be complicit
in the wrongdoing they report. Miriam Baer describes the different motivations attending
these "complicit" whistleblowers, who face the real possibility that their
whistleblowing-even if anonymous risks a kind of self-incrimination by increasing
the likelihood of criminal investigation. 49 Unfortunately, these complicit whistleblowers
will likely be in possession of more valuable information than innocent ones but be
less likely to blow the whistle. 50
B.

Known Unknowns

What we do not know about whistleblowing dwarfs what we do know. First, the
overall incidence of fraud and misconduct is unknown. Believers in the power of
markets, conservatives, and those more optimistic about human nature will be likely to

57

40.

Cherry, supra note 37, at 1052.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

See Robert G. Vaughn, America's FirstComprehensive Statute ProtectingCorporateWhistleblowers,

ADMIN.

47.

L. REv. 1, 14 (2005).
See id.

48. In contrast, identifying who reports real misconduct but whose claim fails for procedural reasons, a
combination of relaxing the law's requirements to make claims easier to bring and better education as to what
legitimate claims look like, and when to bring them, offers the most promising path to reform.

49. Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizingthe Whistleblower 'sDilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 2215, 2247
(2017). Complicating matters yet further, as Baer points out, innocent whistleblowers may mistakenly perceive
themselves to be complicit, and complicit ones may mistakenly perceive themselves to be innocent. Id. at 2245.
50.

Id. at 2242-44.
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believe that fraud is relatively rare the product of a few "bad apples." Market skeptics,
progressives, and cynics will be more likely to believe that the whole corporate barrel is
rotten, and that most fraud remains undetected. While there are ways of approximating
an answer to the question of how pervasive fraudulent corporate behavior is, an accurate
answer is probably impossible because of its hidden nature. The importance of
whistleblowing protections and policy depends in part on how much one thinks fraud is
a problem, as an empirical matter.
Second, there is the problem of the dogs that do not bark the reports that are never
made. Let us imagine an employee who sees wrongdoing while on the job. He reports
the misconduct to his supervisor. The supervisor reports up the chain of command, the
wrongdoer is punished, and the fraud is corrected. These types of healthy organizations,
intent on doing the right thing, will not show up in a whistleblower dataset.51 They will
not be subject to any external governmental discipline. Importantly, they will have little
incentive to publicize their response to wrongdoing because it would counter their
interest to advertise that misconduct occurred at all, and going public would be
unnecessary, in any event, because the problem has already been addressed.
A third risk follows from the fact that, even if the employer is guilty of misconduct,
an employee may not recover in an antiretaliation lawsuit. Statutes of limitations and
other requirements mean that whistleblowing can be hard to do. 2 SOX's current 180-day
limit53 is cramped at best, and from 2002 to 2010 that time limit was a mere 90 days."
Employees need time after suffering a retaliation to recognize that reporting the
misconduct they witnessed might be protected activity and to figure out how to move
forward. Some will never recognize their eligibility for such protection. Others, weighing
the risks of filing a claim, will elect to move on and put their whistleblowing past behind
them.
Fourth, some of the barking dogs are crying wolf. Commentators and legislators are
aware of the risk of frivolous or false reporting, 55 but there are no studies of its incidence.
The lack of empirical research on this question is unsurprising, 56 given how difficult it
51. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provision: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV.
1, 42-43 (2012) [hereinafter Moberly, Ten Years Later].
52.

Id. at 15-17.

53.

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2).

54.

Saibanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 806, § 1514A(b)(2)(D), 116 Stat. 802-03 (2002).

55. See, e.g., Lucienne M. Hartmann, Comment, Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-Like
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of "Greedy," the Eighth Dwarf, 62
MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1305-06 (2011) ("[T]his 'lottery mentality' has, in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act,
already been adopted by whistleblowers and attorneys and will fuel the filing of frivolous complaints."); Bruce
Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd-FrankWhistleblowerBounty Provision, SEC. DOCKET (Sept. 9, 2010, 3:37 PM),
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frank-whistleblower-bounty-provision/
[http://perma.cc/L8LM-PWZR];
Kevin Gosztola, FireDogLake: Financial Services Committee
Hearing:

Whistleblowers Likened to

Bounty Hunters, CONGRESSWOMAN MAXINE WATERS (May 12, 2011),

http://waters.house.gov/media-center/in-the-news/firedoglake-financial-services-committee-hearing-whistleblo
Whistleblower
USDOL/OALJ: Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX")
wers-likened [http://perma.cc/E5JN-Z8SX];
Digest: Frivolous Complaint; Sanctions; Complaint's Participation in Wrongful Conduct, DOL.GOV,
http://www.dol.gov/agencies/oalj/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/REFERENCES/REFERENCE_WORKS/SO
X_DIGEST_FRIVOLOUS_COMPLAINT_SANCTIONS [http://perma.cc/Z4HD-LHEK].
56.

One study suggests that "contrary to what some in the corporate lobby might fear, whistleblowing is

rarely 'frivolous, misleading, or unreliable."' Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt
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would be to actually study such a topic. For instance, in an experimental setting or survey,
how many individuals would answer affirmatively when asked whether they would make
up a whistleblower antiretaliation claim to get back at their boss?
Thus, it is clear that false reporting exists in theory, but risk of its existence is the
most that has been said about it. For example, Yehonaton Givati describes the risk of
false reporting as "well noted by policy makers and those active in the area of
whistleblowing."s? He cites in support of this proposition (1) a U.K. report that concluded
against the payment of rewards to whistleblowers because, among other reasons, it
"could lead to false or delayed reporting";58 (2) the FinancialTimes, which noted that
"the scale of the potential pay-outs" under Dodd-Frank "could generate rogue tip-offs by
disaffected employees"; 59 (3) the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which observed that
"[i]nstead of allowing companies to identify and fix problems, we are just creating a
lottery";60 (4) a report by the law firm DLA Piper on whistleblowing that noted the risk
of "malicious or unfounded allegations" against employers;6 1 and (5) academics Howse
and Daniels, who observe that "corporations are vulnerable to false claims made by
opportunistic whistleblowers."6 2 Each of these sources, the reader will notice, observes
that the current framework creates the potential for false reporting. The question,
however, is not whether the risk of false reporting exists in theory, but how much of a
risk it is in practice. Givati creates a model that accounts for the possibility of false
reporting, 63 but the gap between the model and reality remains in question.
Part I.B has described the many "unknowns" associated with whistleblower
behavior in order to emphasize the importance of the data that are available. Section III
will examine those data. But before that, we must examine the available mechanisms for
screening out more nonmeritorious claims.

To Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisionsof the Dodd-FrankAct, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73,
78 (2012).
57.

Yehonatan Givati, A Theory of Whistleblower Rewards, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 51 (2015).

58.

Id. at 51-52 n.5 (quoting PUB. CONCERN AT WORK & WHISTLEBLOWING COMM'N, REPORT ON THE

EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR WORKPLACE WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE UK 14 (2013),

http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/public-concern-at-work/wp-content/uploads/images/2018/09/08222935/w
bc-report-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/23QY-RZ8R]).
59. Id. (quoting Jean Eaglesham & Brooke Masters, US To PayBig Sums for Wall St Tip-Offs, FIN. TIMES
(Aug.
8,
2010),
http://www.ft.com/content/efa8a32a-a3la-lldf-8cf4-00144feabdc0
[http://perma.cc/3UWV-XS9P]).
60. Id. (quoting David S. Hilzenrath, The Wall Street Snitch Pitch, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2010, 12:59
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/22/AR2010112200513.html
[http://perma.cc/H748-H4BQ]).
61.

Id. at 52 (quoting DLA PIPER, WHISTLEBLOWING: AN EMPLOYER' S GUIDE TO GLOBAL COMPLIANCE

6 (2d ed. 2015), http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/06/whistleblowing-law-2015%/020
[http://perma.cc/38KM-6HNH] (click "Read the report (PDF) >>")).
62. Id. (quoting Robert Howse & Ronald D. Daniels, Rewarding Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits
of an Incentive-Based Compliance Strategy, in CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA 525, 526 (Ronald J.
Daniels
&
Randall
Morck
eds.
1995),
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=law_series
[http://perma.cc/FA5L-MWL9]).
63.

Id. at 51.
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Carrotsor Shields? Bounties vs. AntiretaliationProtections

A key inquiry in the literature examines the relative effectiveness of bounty systems
("I blew the whistle, therefore I get a cut") as compared to antiretaliation systems ("I
blew the whistle and suffered for it, so make me whole"). The underlying question
bounties address is what motivates a whistleblower, with the goal being to encourage
more meritorious reporting. Antiretaliation, in contrast, focuses on the separate, though
related, goal of discouraging retaliation and thus preventing harm to whistleblowers.
Antiretaliation measures may indeed encourage individuals to report misconduct, but
only by way of neutralizing a disincentive, rather than providing a positive incentive to
blow the whistle. These present a fundamental difference in approach, and weighing the
pros and cons of each mechanism forms a key component of Section IV's analytical
framework.
Identifying the incentives for meritorious whistleblowing is crucial to balancing
incentives and remedies properly. If we think of the whistleblower as a hero acting
courageously because of an inner moral compass that compels her to speak out in the
face of wrongdoing then an optimal design will merely offer protection from
retaliation. In contrast, less morally motivated whistleblowers may well be enticed to
report misconduct only if they see a personal upside for doing so. Thus, whether we
choose an antiretaliation or bounty system depends on the fundamental motivations of
individuals who report misconduct. This consideration in turn implicates our key
questions: if we are worried about systematic underreporting, then a bounty becomes an
attractive tool because it affirmatively encourages whistleblowing. In contrast, if we are
concerned about false reporting in a given area, antiretaliation is a more appropriate
policy instrument because it merely protects a person who voluntarily chooses (without
monetary incentive) to report misconduct from retaliation.
But the situation is still more complicated. Offering a financial reward for
whistleblowing to a morally motivated whistleblower would be a poor design choice,
and not merely because it would overcompensate her. Even worse, reducing the act of
reporting misconduct from an act of conscience to a financial transaction risks "crowding
out" those whistleblowers motivated by ethical considerations. 64 That is, providing
external rewards can undermine the intrinsic motivation to do the right thing because
"when people attribute their behavior to external rewards, they discount any moral
incentives for their behavior." 65 Given the centrality of understanding whistleblower
motivation, Part I.D turns to evidence on that subject.
D.

ExperimentalEvidence on WhistleblowerMotivation

Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel conducted research on the question of which
incentives best motivate whistleblowers in an experimental setting. 66 Their series of
experiments used surveys to determine the effectiveness of various design choices. 67

64. See David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and
the Challenge of OptimalDesign, 15 THEORETICAL JNQUIRIESL. 605,615 (2014) [hereinafter Engstrom, Whither
Whistleblowing].
65.

Feldman & Lobel, supra note 39, at 1178-79.

66.

See id. at 1151.

67.

Id. at 1176, 1187-89.
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They examined three different types of whistleblower protections. 68 The first,
antiretaliation protections, aimed to make the whistleblower whole for any harms she
suffers as a result of her whistleblowing.69 The second involved either imposing
affirmative duties to report or, on the flipside, imposing liabilities for failure to report
illegality. 70 The law typically imposes such duties on senior officers or professionals
such as lawyers, accountants, doctors, and teachers.? The third approach involved
financial incentives, which can, in practice, resemble either the pure qui tam approach of
the False Claims Act,7 2 which empowers private litigants to take the reins if the
government declines to do so, or a bounty awarded at the discretion of an agency, such
as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or SEC. 73
A basic question Feldman and Lobel sought to answer was the motivation of
whistleblowers. As already observed, whistleblowers who are motivated from an internal
sense of what is right might well be put off by an incentive system that rewards them
monetarily for doing the right thing.74 The authors did indeed find evidence of "crowding
out" in their words, the act of "framing reporting as a commodity with a price tag
attached may actually suppress internally motivated action." 5 Intriguingly, for
misconduct perceived to be less severe, low financial rewards prompted the least
likelihood to report. 76 In fact, "the introduction of small bounties may actually decrease
the rate at which [less morally outrageous misconduct] is reported." 7 This research may
be especially relevant in the context of financial misconduct, which is often perceived to
be less ethically problematic because of the absence of a harmed individual (as opposed
to a whistleblower in air safety, for example, who may be acting in the interest of
passenger safety). 78
Thus, Feldman and Lobel's findings suggest that antiretaliation measures provide
more effective incentives for whistleblowing than bounties do, at least in some settings
for some whistleblowers. 79 There may not be one right answer or rather, the answer
may be contextual. Given the near ubiquity of compliance programs in corporate

68.

Id. at 1156.

69.

See id. at 1161-63, 1176-77.

70.

Id. at 1163-67.

71.

Id. at 1163.

72.

31 U.S.C.

73.

Feldman & Lobel, supra note 39, at 1168.

74.

See id. at 1154, 1202.

§§

3729-33.

75. Id. at 1202. More specifically, they find offering low financial rewards to be the worst design
mechanism, because they crowd out internally motivated whistleblowers. Id. In contrast, iffinancial rewards are
sufficiently high, this crowding out effect largely disappears. Id.
76.

Id. at 1194.

77.

Id. at 1202 (emphasis added).

78.

See, e.g., David Craig, Financial Crime: Bringing to Light the Cost of 'Victimless' Lawbreaking,
TABB
F.
(Oct.
20,
2017),
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/financial-crime-bringing-to-light-the-cost-of-victimless-lawbreaking/
[http://perma.cc/WW9R-Z6ZU]; Martin Ivezic, What Are Financial Crimes? From Fraud to Terrorism,
MARVIN
IVEZIC
(Mar.
6,
2009),
http://cyberkinetic.com/fincrime/fincrim-fraud-terrorism/

[http://perma.cc/6Y4C-S6FT].
79. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 39, at 1202-04.
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America, with their emphasis on reporting wrongdoing internally, it may be that an
external bounty does not deter internal whistleblowing much at all.
Indeed, heterogeneity among whistleblowers could mean that different incentives
are best suited for different populations. David Engstrom, for instance, suggests that
whistleblowers at more senior levels of management will have better information about
misconduct "because of their more synoptic organizational view." 80 However, these
senior-level employees will also be more likely to have firm- or industry-specific skills
and knowledge, making them less mobile and therefore more vulnerable.8 1 Thus,
antiretaliation provisions and safeguards of anonymity might matter more to them than
to rank-and-file employees. 82 Engstrom argues that regulators could get higher quality
information by focusing on antiretaliation protections rather than on bounties. 83
Beyond motivation, the literature has also examined the importance of institutional
design whether courts or an administrative agency should administer whistleblower
incentives or protections. Part I.E examines this question in the bounty context.
E.

Courtsvs. Agencies

Some literature has focused on the organizational design question, specifically
regarding the optimal design for a bounty mechanism of reward for whistleblower tips
to the government. Understanding the insights this literature offers will be important for
Section IV's framework.
There are two basic models: a pure qui tam (with False Claims Act suits serving as
the chief model), and a government-mediated bounty reward system (with Dodd-Frank
and the IRS whistleblowing offices serving as exemplars).
The False Claims Act provides private litigants the ability to file suit on behalf of
the federal government against those who have defrauded it.84 The whistleblower files
under seal and provides information on the fraud to the government. 85 The government
then has sixty days to determine whether to intervene and take control of the lawsuit. 86
Importantly, if the government elects not to intervene, the whistleblower can continue
her suit on her own and recover damages on behalf of the government. 87
Dodd-Frank introduced a modified qui tam model to reward successful
whistleblowers. Dodd-Frank provided a mechanism where whistleblowers who report
federal securities law violations to the SEC could earn bounties where the SEC obtained

80.

Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing, supra note 64, at 615.

81.

See id.

82.

See id.

83.

Id.

84.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).

85.

Id.

86.

Id. If it does so, the whistleblower collects 15-25% of any damages recovered. Id. § 3730(d)(1).

§ 3730(b)(2).

87. Id. §§ 3730(c)(3), 3730(d)(2). In this event, the whistleblower receives 25-30% of recovered
damages. Id. § 3730(d)(2). If the government wishes to do so, it can dismiss the suit entirely. David Freeman
Engstrom, Harnessingthe PrivateAttorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1244, 1271-72 (2012) [hereinafter Engstrom, Harnessingthe PrivateAttorney General]. The Department of
Justice must also consent to a private dismissal or settlement. Id. at 1272.
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more than one million dollars in monetary sanctions paid by a wrongdoer. 88 Unlike the
more venerable False Claims Act federal qui tam provision, however, Dodd-Frank
whistleblowers have no independent standing to pursue violations. 89 That is,
whistleblowers cannot pursue a case in the face of government inaction. Instead,
whistleblowers only receive money if and when the government successfully pursues a
claim and obtains more than one million dollars. 90 It may help to think of Dodd-Frank as
offering a "cash for tips" system, as opposed to the true qui tam, which provides the
plaintiff some control over whether the suit proceeds.91
A number of scholars have analyzed the theoretical risks and benefits of these two
models private litigation versus agency mediation for bounty-style rewards side by
side. 92 Yet scholars have not attended to the data accumulated in almost eleven years of
experience with Dodd-Frank's "cash for tips" modified qui tam system. Section III
attends to this deficiency.
1.

Agency Enforcement

One obvious benefit of relying on agency enforcement is agency expertise.
Agencies are comprised of specialists who train for years, building up both individual
and institutional know-how. 93 What is more, even if these agencies are often described
as "cash-strapped," they still have access to resources far beyond the average plaintiff.
94
Agencies are also able to centralize and control the volume and intensity of litigation.
95
Importantly, they are accountable to the public in a way that private litigants are not.
The counterweight to agency expertise is the risk of relying on government
bureaucracy. The stereotypical bureaucrat may be more interested in safe cases and easy

88. The statute defines "monetary sanctions" as "any monies, including penalties, disgorgement, and
interest, ordered to be paid; and . . any monies deposited into a . . fund . . as a result of such action or any
settlement of such action." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(4). Whistleblowers must voluntarily provide the SEC with
original information about securities law violations. See Rapp, supra note 56, at 73, 144.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1) (defining "covered judicial or administrative action" as any action
brought by the Commission).
90. See Rapp, supra note 56, at 78-79 ("[Dodd-Frank's] biggest failure maybe that it does not create true
qui tam structures. That is, the law facilitates payments to whistleblowers, but provides no avenue for
whistleblowers to pursue securities fraud actions directly. Instead, payments are only available in instances in
3
which the SEC recovers civil fines."). Dodd-Frank's rules allow awards of between 10- 0% of collected
monetary sanctions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1).
91. The SEC, not the Department of Labor, is the proper agency to report these tips to, and the
determination of the 10-30% award is in the discretion of the agency. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A).
92. See, e.g., Engstrom, Harnessing the PrivateAttorney General, supra note 87, at 1253; Anthony J.
Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam, 91 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1169,
1176-78, 1180 (2014).
93. See Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation ofAmerican Rulemaking, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 747-67 (1996) (describing the need for agencies as expert bodies in complex
societies while noting that "[t]he pressures for balancing the federal budget have resulted in stringent limitations
on agency resources").

94.
(2018).
95.

See David Kwok, The Public Wrong of Whistleblower Retaliation, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1225, 1242-43
See id. 1242-44.
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wins than in ferreting out and punishing cases of retaliation. 96 More insidious still is the
risk of agency capture, the concern that industry exercises undue influence on agency
action and subverts the agency's proper role of working for the public good. 97 The
concern from a capture perspective would be that antiretaliation claims are
underenforced by officials overly sympathetic to defendants. 98
Beyond capture, Engstrom points out that "more pedestrian" bureaucratic
pathologies can lead to suboptimal enforcement. 99 For example, an agency might "seek
to burnish its reputation and curry favor with legislative overseers by pursuing a mix of
high-value, marquee cases and low-value, easy-to-win cases, leaving a swath of
under-deterred misconduct in between." 100 And it might simply be that "cash-strapped"
agencies lack the resources for optimal whistleblower retaliation enforcement. 101 Of
course, if the federal government had the will to bring to bear the sum of its resources
against these claims, its capacity to pursue claims would outstrip that of a private litigant.
2.

Qui Tam

A lawyer-driven qui tam model in many ways offers the mirror image of agencies'
strengths and weaknesses. Contrasted against deep agency expertise is the countervailing
consideration of lawyer expertise. Lawyers new to the field will certainly not have the
same level of expertise as an agency. Set against this lack of knowledge and experience
is their superior motivation they are far more driven than their bureaucrat counterparts
because they will be paid if, and only if, they obtain financial recompense for their
clients.10 2 If unsuccessful, they will have expended considerable resources in anticipation
of a payout that never materialized.103 But the expertise factor does not weigh solely in
the government's favor. If attorneys handle serial qui tam actions, they may develop
expertise of their own. Specifically, repeat-player attorneys who specialize in
whistleblowing cases may well fare better than their agency counterparts. 104 Empirical
research reveals that, at least in the qui tam context, these experienced lawyers are more
successful than less experienced ones. 105

96. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The PrivateEnforcement ofLaw, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
25, 39 (1975) (arguing that an increase in fines leads to fewer cases but more deterrence).
97. See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies As Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 674 (2013)
("[R]egulated parties will exert disproportionate influence over agency gatekeepers, systematically bending
gatekeeping decisions in their favor and thus compromising the agency's stewardship of zealousness,
coordination, and legislative fidelity within the regime.").
98. See id.; Casey & Niblett, supra note 92, at 1179. As Casey and Niblett point out, this logic presumes
that courts are immune to industry capture in a way that agencies are not. Casey & Niblett, supra note 92,

at 1180.
99.

Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing, supra note 64, at 618.

100. Id.
101. See Kwok, supra note 94, at 1228, 1242 ("[W]histleblowers may also provide greater and further
resources towards litigation in comparison to constrained government budgets.").
102. See J. Randy Beck, The False ClaimsAct and the English Eradicationof Qui Tam Legislation, 78
N.C. L. REV. 539, 541, 624 (2000).
103.

See id. at 624.

104.

See Engstrom, Harnessingthe PrivateAttorney General, supra note 87, at 1257-58.

105. Id. at 1249, 1298-99.
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The qui tam incentive is a powerful one. Yet that incentive is not always positive.
Empowering private litigants to undertake qui tam-style actions, which are "untempered
by prosecutorial discretion," may well result in the pursuit of cases best left unbrought,
"yielding wasteful over-deterrence and unnecessary expenditure of social resources." 106
Moreover, Engstrom suggests that these cases tend to push on the law's boundaries,
exploiting regulatory ambiguities rather than serving as a failsafe to ensure that clear
wrongdoing is punished. 107 These can lead to qui tam actions that drift further from the
core legislative purposes of the statute over time. 108 Another risk is that the efficiencies
qui tam attorneys get from specialization may reduce their costs, allowing them to bring
more marginal cases. 109
The kinds of harm may matter as well. Engstrom also suggests that "direct harms,"
such as workplace safety, are more likely to involve a small number of employees that
are directly affected." 0 Thus, these employees are likely to report misconduct either to
protect themselves or because of moral obligation.1" In contrast, indirect harms, like
securities fraud or tax fraud, lack the same moral disapprobation because the harm is
"highly diffuse and evenly distributed among a large, and largely anonymous, group of
people. 11 2 He suggests that larger bounties would be more effective for these harms. 1 3
Recall that, in response to the same concern, Feldman and Lobel find that antiretaliation
provides stronger motivation." 4 On the flipside, however, David Kwok argues that these
indirect harms, where the whistleblower's interest and the public interest do not align,
pose a greater risk of questionable claims." 5 On this reasoning, he argues that the
government should prioritize control over tax antiretaliation above workplace safety
claims. 16 The kind of indirect harms SOX seeks to address may suggest that an
antiretaliation mechanism is superior to a bounty mechanism for financial harms.
Thus, both the qui tam and agency mechanisms could result in suboptimal
enforcement whether through the pursuit of cases best left unbrought, the neglect of
worthy ones, or both. Especially in the fraught nature of whistleblower claims, some
percentage of cases surely have merit, while others are just as certainly frivolous. The
risk of overzealous plaintiffs' attorneys extorting employers while overlooking
meritorious but low-dollar-value claims is high. One answer to these suboptimal
enforcement concerns is providing data to allow policymakers and researchers alike to
examine sorting mechanisms as Section III will do.

106. Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing, supra note 64, at 619; see also Kwok, supra note 94, at 1243
("[T]oo many people with weak retaliation claims may bring cases forward.").
107.

Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing, supra note 64, at 619.

108. Id.
109.

Engstrom, Harnessingthe PrivateAttorney General, supra note 87, at 1260.

110.

Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing, supra note 64, at 621.

111.

See id. at 622.

112. Id.
113. Id. at 623. The determinacy of the legal mandate being enforced is another variable Engstrom
considers. Id. at 624-25. This factor is outside the concern of this Article because both SOX and Dodd-Frank
focus on relatively determinate fraud mandates.
114.

See generallyFeldman & Lobel, supra note 39.

115.

Kwok, supra note 94, at 1229.

116. Id.
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Having compared the costs and benefits of entrusting enforcement to private
litigants with those of empowering government agencies to pursue claims in the
relatively well-documented qui tam context, it is time to examine that literature in the
antiretaliation context. The choice comes down to agency bureaucracy versus private
litigants. Generally, few commentators have focused on this design question in the
antiretaliation context, as opposed to that of the bounty/qui tam context. The one
exception to this silence is David Kwok. In The Public Wrong of Whistleblower
Retaliation, he surveys several whistleblowing regimes but focuses much of his attention
on OSHA's administration of SOX.117 Kwok argues that "the legislative focus on public
enforcement is strong evidence that Congress recognizes the public importance of
combating whistleblower retaliation."118 In Kwok's telling, Congress tasked an agency
with sorting antiretaliation claims not for efficiency or competency reasons, but because
of the public's interest in protecting these claims. 119
There are two problems with this explanation. First, there is another, equally logical
explanation for Congress to rely on an agency as an intermediary for whistleblower
claims: if Congress had weighed the risk of spurious claims heavily, it may have judged
agency interpolation to be the best protection against such a risk. 120
Second, Kwok reasons that the public wrong of whistleblower retaliation requires
a public response not only in the sense of empowering an agency to act on the public's
behalf, but also in the sense of a publicized response. 12 1 The public may indeed have an
interest in learning the truth about retaliation. 122 Yet this argument makes little sense in
the case of SOX, given that the administrative proceedings are confidential to protect the
whistleblower's identity. 123 While this justification may work for Dodd-Frank's direct
cause of action, where defendants whose employees are willing to file a lawsuit will be
subject to the publicity of a trial, 1 24 it does not apply to SOX's OSHA-mediated
system. 125 Of course, Dodd-Frank's publicized cases are not examples of public
enforcement at all, but rather are the products of private litigants' actions. 126 Indeed, as
further evidence of the nonpublic governmental treatment of whistleblowers, even in the
few successful Dodd-Frank bounty awards, the identity of the whistleblower is kept
secret (although the fact of the award is trumpeted). 127

117.

See generallyid.

118. Id. at 1244.

119. See id. Kwok dismisses as an explanation that congressional approach merely evolved overtime, or
that Congress cared only about making a show of interest in whistleblower protection. Id. at 1241-42.
120. See id. at 1242. Indeed, Kwok himself acknowledges that Congress might not "trust private
enforcement of these whistleblower retaliation claims." Id. at 1243.
121. See id. at 1244-46 ("The common congressional mandate for agency investigation suggests that the
agency, and thus the public, has an interest in learning the truth about retaliation complaints.").
122. Id. at 1245.
123.

See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.104(a), (c), (d) (2021).

124.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B).

125.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(b) (2021).

126.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).

127. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC 2019-165, SEC Awards More Than $1.8 Million to Whistleblower
(Aug. 29, 2019), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-165 [http://perma.cc/MQB8-2RU3] ("[A]n
award of more than $1.8 million [was given] to a whistleblower whose information and assistance were critically
important to the success of an enforcement action involving misconduct committed overseas. After alerting the
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In fact, in terms of institutional design, Congress has been of two minds when it
comes to whistleblower retaliation. With SOX, Congress chose not to empower
individual plaintiffs, but instead to interpose an agency to evaluate claims and dispense
awards. 128 With Dodd-Frank, Congress created a private right of action for
antiretaliation, 129 but an agency-mediated bounty mechanism.130
In closing this Section, it pays to emphasize the importance of antiretaliation.
Engstrom and Casey devote much attention to the agency-versus-courts institutional
design question in the bounty context, but there is reason to believe it is even more
important in the antiretaliation context, particularly because antiretaliation claims
address clear harms. At the most fundamental level, whistleblowers can face demotion
or loss of a job. 131 In the most egregious cases, whistleblowers can put their employers
out of business and may further lose to the extent that they own shares in the company
for which they work. 13 2
But these losses are not the only ones whistleblowers face. Their fellow employees
may ostracize them, blaming them for exposing the company's ills.1 33 Whistleblowers
often speak of the many psychological harms they suffer.134 They also fear, sometimes
quite rightly, that being labeled a "whistleblower" might harm their future employment
prospects in the industry.135 Many whistleblowers report regret at having blown the
whistle, knowing what they know now.136 These losses are real harms that antiretaliation
cannot address. They remain harms even if the ultimate "payoff' the government
receives from the whistleblowing is relatively low in dollar amount. This category of
cases, where there is a real mismatch between the harm suffered and the magnitude of a
qui tam style recovery, merits attention.
Equally troubling are the cases where the inverse is true -a tipster who suffered no
retaliation at all could win the OWP "lottery" and receive a multimillion-dollar payout,
while a blue-collar whistleblower could be fired for her pains and receive nothing

agency to the violations, the whistleblower provided extensive and ongoing cooperation during the course of the
investigation, including the review of documents and the provision of sworn testimony, and continued to provide
additional new information that advanced the investigation."); Press Release, SEC 2019-81, SEC Awards $3
Million to Joint Whistleblowers (June 3, 2019), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-81
[http://perma.cc/493C-RKYL] ("The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced an award of $3
million to whistleblowers whose tip launched the SEC's investigation and subsequent successful enforcement
action involving an alleged securities law violation that impacted retail investors. The whistleblowers submitted
their tip jointly to the Commission and will share the award. In this case, the whistleblowers also undertook
significant and timely steps to have their employer remediate the harm caused by the alleged violations.").
128.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A).

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
130. See Id. §§ 78u-6(b)(1), (c)(1)(A).
131. Rapp, supra note 56, at 113.
129.

132. See Id. at 113, 117, 120. Enron stock made up sixty percent of the average Enron employee's 401(k),
meaning that the company's bankruptcy not only cost an employee her job but also a substantial part of her
savings.
The
Post-Enron
401(k),
FORBES
(Oct.
20,
2003,
12:00
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2003/10/20/cx_aw_1020retirement.html?sh=5b03ef692824
[http://perma.cc/CE3Y-H52U].
133.

Rapp, supra note 56, at 117.

134. See Id.
135.

See Id. at 113-15.

136.

See Id. at 113.
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because her potential damages are too low to tempt a lawyer working on contingency.
Having assessed the theory of antiretaliation, it is time to move to the empirical literature.
II.

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

Part I.D described Feldman and Lobel's incentives matrix. Their work, while
empirical in nature, focuses on the question of choosing between a bounty or
antiretaliation regime and was thus discussed as a way to situate whistleblower theory.
As a reminder, their findings suggest that people are more likely to respond to
antiretaliation protections than to bounties.
Richard Moberly conducted the only empirical study of the Department of Labor
whistleblower data from the initial SOX period of 2005-2006.137 He obtained 470 initial
OSHA decisions using a Freedom of Information Act 138 request and reviewed 236
published ALJ opinions. 139 Moberly found low win rates: 3.6% at the OSHA level and
6.5% at the ALJ level.140 But there were several deficiencies in his method. First, the
time period of Moberly's study was soon after SOX went into effect. 14 1 OSHA's early
administration of antiretaliation protection was truly dismal. In 2011, following several
devastating governmental audits and reports, OSHA underwent a top-to-bottom review
and overhaul. 14 2
More importantly, however, Moberly made a potentially problematic move by
excluding settlements and withdrawals. 14 3 Presumably, defendants faced with a strong
case will generally be inclined to settle. Given that SOX caps damages at back pay and
costs, plaintiffs receiving a reasonable offer will be inclined to accept those offers; there
would be little sense in holding out, since the possibility of high-dollar punitive damages
is foreclosed. Thus, by excluding settlements, Moberly's study may provide a warped
view of the cases. Moberly himself acknowledges this problem.14 4
More philosophically, as Moberly recognizes in later work, 145 in order to evaluate
win rates or any kind of case outcome-one needs to know what the proper baseline
is. In Moberly's own words: "[W]hat should the proper win rate be for a claim? That
question might be difficult to answer because the 'ideal' win rate depends, in part, upon

137. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 70 (2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Unfulfilled
Expectations].

138.
5 U.S.C. § 552.
139. Id. at 87 n.111.
140. Id. at 91.
141. The law went into effect in October 2002. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See generally
Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 137 (covering only the first three years after the statute's
enactment).
142. Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., US Department of Labor's OSHA Announces
Measures
To
Improve
Whistleblower
Protection
Program
(Aug.
1,
2011),
http://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/08012011 [http://perma.cc/P8KH-576A].
143.

See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 137, at 92.

144. Id. at 98 ("Do settlements provide employees relief comparable to wins? It is difficult to say whether
a settlement should be counted as an employee 'win,' given that both sides inevitably compromise their claims
when they settle.").
145.

See Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note 51, at 28.
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the number of meritorious claims filed, which is likely impossible to reasonably
determine." 14 6 Again, we confront the problem of the unknowns.
Thus, there are two compounding problems with Moberly's exclusion of
settlements. One is the relatively commonsense point that strong cases will generally
settle. 14 7 Layered atop this problem, there is specific reason to believe, based on the
agency's own reporting, that most successful Department of Labor plaintiffs settle.148
Having sketched out whistleblowing's problem-layered unknowns upon unknowns
and reviewed the state of the literature, it is time to focus on the data at hand. For that,
we must understand the three parallel whistleblowing regimes focusing on financial
fraud, as well as Dodd-Frank's bounty mechanism. Accordingly, Section III turns to the
statutes at issue.
III.

THE LAY OF THE LAND: SOX VS. DODD-FRANK

Section 806 of SOX instituted the first federal whistleblowing-protection statute in
the securities arena. 14 9 Its stated goal was to provide "all relief necessary to make the
employee whole," including back pay with interest and attorneys' fees.150 The focus is
not on the quality of information or gravity of misconduct alleged.1 Indeed, there need
not even be any actual misconduct in the organization that is, the employee may be
wrong about the misconduct she reports on. 152 The gravamen of the complaint is that the
employee blew the whistle and was fired or demoted or made to suffer in other
ways because of that whistleblowing activity.IS 3 Importantly, SOX provides relief for
15 4
retaliation, but provides no extra incentive or bounty to reward whistleblowers.
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank similarly addresses retaliation claims, but has different
coverage and remedies, as well as a markedly different procedure for addressing claims.
Finally, Dodd-Frank introduced a bounty system, as described in the Part II.C. After
surveying these whistleblower-protection and incentivization regimes, this Section
concludes with some qualitative data, consisting of interviews with attorneys who work
with whistleblowers to navigate these various mechanisms of relief and reward, to
provide background on how these claims play out in the real world.

146. Id. (emphasis omitted).
147. The literature and common sense alike argue that weak cases will settle, and that cases only go to
trial when the parties have conflicting views on the strength of their claims. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte
Lanvers, What Is the SettlementRate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 124 (2009).
148.

See

U.S.

GOV'T

PROGRAM: BETTER DATA AND

ACCOUNTABILITY

IMPROVED

OFF.,

GAO-09-106,

WHISTLEBLOWER

PROTECTION

OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP ENSURE PROGRAM QUALITY AND

CONSISTENCY 4 (2009) [hereinafter WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT],

http://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-106.pdf [http://perma.cc/28XQ-Y2UL].
149.
803-04.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 806(a),

§ 1514A(c)(1)-(2),

116 Stat. 745,

150. Id.
151.

See id.

152.

See id.

153.

See id.

154. See id. Dodd-Frank, enacted eight years later, would provide the first bounty reward system. See
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
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Coverage ofAntiretaliationin Both Statutes

1.

Subject Matter

SOX's antiretaliation protection applies to any employee who blows the whistle on
conduct the employee "reasonably believes" constitutes a violation of the mail fraud,
wire fraud, bank fraud, or securities laws. 155 Companies covered by the Act are those
required to make filings under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 156 Thus, it covers, most
commonly, publicly traded companies. 157 Companies are required to file if they list their
securities on a national securities exchange or if they maintain more than $10 million in
assets whose securities are held by more than 500 unaccredited investors or 2,000 people
total. 158 In contrast, Dodd-Frank protects whistleblowers who provide information solely
regarding securities fraud. 159 While covering similar activities, SOX's subject-matter
reach is broader than that of Dodd-Frank. 160
2.

Reporting Requirement

An employee is protected by SOX's Section 806 if he or she reports information to,
or an investigation is conducted by (1) a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(2) any member or committee of Congress; (3) any person with supervisory authority
over the employee; or (4) any other person who has "the authority to investigate,
discover, or terminate misconduct." 161 Importantly, note that a plaintiff need not report
the retaliation to an outside agency to obtain relief under SOX. A plaintiff who reports
misconduct to their supervisor, and never reports that same misconduct externally, would
still have an antiretaliation claim under SOX if fired.

155. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). This includes any rule or regulation of the SEC, or any provision of federal
law relating to fraud against shareholders. Id. Covered conduct includes an employee who "file[s], ... testif[ies],
participate[s] in, or otherwise assist[s] in a proceeding . . relating to an alleged violation of section 1341, 1343,
1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal
law relating to fraud against shareholders." Id. § 1514A(a)(2).
156.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§ 78a-78qq).
157. See Andrew F. Fowler, RegistrationRequirements Under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, LEXIS,
http://plus.lexis.com/ [http://perma.cc/5NN5-HSVW] (last updated Oct. 20, 2020) (describing how there are two
avenues to reach the need for registration under the Exchange Act and how Section 12(b) registration
requirements result from the decision to list a company's securities on a national securities exchange, and
registration is often taken as part of the IPO process).

158. Id.
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. Covered conduct includes an employee who "provid[es] information to the
[SEC] . . . initiat[es], testif[ies] in, or assist[s] in any investigation or judicial or administrative action . . . [or
makes any securities] disclosures that are required [by law]." Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Section 922 of Dodd-Frank
prohibits employers from discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, directly or indirectly, or in
any other manner discriminating against, a whistle-blower who provides information to the SEC; initiates,
testifies, or assists in any investigation or judicial or administrative action based upon or related to such
information; or makes disclosures that are required or protected under the securities laws. Id.
160. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-I (2021) (Dodd-Frank protects only those whistleblowers who "provide
the Commission with original information about violations the Federal securities laws.").
161.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 806(a), § 1514A(a)(1), 116 Stat. 745, 803.
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In 2018, in DigitalRealty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 162 the Supreme Court applied a
different standard to whistleblower claims under Dodd-Frank. 163 Resolving a circuit
split, the Court required that plaintiffs report to the SEC before being eligible to make a
claim under Dodd-Frank's antiretaliation provisions. 164 This marked a significant
departure that foreclosed a direct cause of action to whistleblowers who are fired after
reporting misconduct internally. Accordingly, it created an incentive for whistleblowers
to go straight to the SEC at least if they understand whistleblower laws or obtain legal
counsel before blowing the whistle.
3.

Prohibited Retaliation

Employees who blow the whistle in these cases are protected from a broad swath
of retaliation. An employer may not "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass . . . or . . . discriminate against[] a whistleblower [as a result of that
involvement]." 165 Dodd-Frank uses almost identical language in its attempt to provide
similar protections to whistleblowers. 166
4.

Statute of Limitations, Burden of Proof, and Remedy

Employees seeking relief originally had 90 days from the time the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known about the retaliation to file a complaint. 167 Besides
enacting its own whistleblower protections, Dodd-Frank amended several SOX
whistleblower provisions to increase protection of whistleblowers. 168 Most importantly,
it lengthened the statute of limitations for retaliation complaints under SOX from 90 to
180 days after the date on which the violation occurs or after the date on which the
employee becomes aware of the violation. 169

162.

138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).

163. See Somers, 138 S. Ct. at 778 (holding that in order to be a "whistleblower," one must provide
information "to the Commission" before the retaliation).
164.

See id.

165.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).

166. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2010) ("No company ... may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment .... ").
167.

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 806, § 1514A(b)(2)(D), 116 Stat. 803 (2002).

168. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124
Stat. 1845-47 (2010). Other amendments also added protection for employees from retaliation by nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations (as defined in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. § 78c)) or their officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors, and agents. Id. § 922(b) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)). Section 922(c) of Dodd-Frank also provided parties with a right to a jury
trial in district court actions brought under Sarbanes-Oxley's "kick-out" provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B),
which provides that, if the secretary has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint
and there is no showing that there has been delay due to the bad faith of the complainant, the complainant may
bring an action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court of the United States, which
will have jurisdiction over such action without regard to the amount in controversy. Id.
169. See Dodd-Frank § 922 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D)). It further provided
that whistleblower protection may not be waived by any agreement, policy form, or condition of employment,
including by a predispute arbitration agreement. Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)). Accordingly,
it provided that no predispute arbitrationagreement would be valid or enforceable. Id. The SEC has taken several
actions against corporations who have purported to preempt whistleblowing protections or make claims on
whistleblowing rewards. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Nirenberg, FederalLaborLaws Do Not Preempt Union Members
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Dodd-Frank claims and SOX claims differ in important ways in terms of statute of
limitations and remedy. Dodd-Frank's statute of limitations, far more generous than
SOX's original 90-day time period, or even the expanded 180-days, is six years after the
date of the violation or three years after the date when the material facts were known or
reasonably should have been known to a plaintiff.1 70 And whereas SOX provides for
reinstatement, back pay, attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and expert witness fees,
plaintiffs under Dodd-Frank can seek all those remedies plus two times the amount of
back pay owed.17 1
Finally, under Dodd-Frank, the whistleblowing behavior has to be the "but-for"
cause for the retaliation; under SOX's more forgiving standard, the behavior need merely
be a contributing factor. 172 Under these causation standards, a court might well believe
it could not make an award to a whistleblower with a poor performance record even if
she blew the whistle on actual misconduct. 173 Employees who fail the SOX "but-for" test
in OSHA's initial review and do not appeal will not appear in a dataset. In contrast, those
under Dodd-Frank will.
Differences in subject matter, statutes of limitations, and remedies obviously matter
when comparing across regimes. Nevertheless, these statutes offer real-world
information about two radically different mechanisms whereby whistleblowers can seek
relief. Having described the coverage of each statute, the next Part turns to the process
by which they can vindicate their claims.
B.

Procedure

1.

SOX

Employees seeking relief under Section 806 of SOX must file a complaint with the
Department of Labor.17 4 The procedure for filing a complaint is fairly easy. Employees
can visit or call their local OSHA office or send a written complaint to their closest

Whistleblower Claim, RABNER BAUMGART
BEN-ASHER
& NiRENBERG
(Sept.
1,
2016),
http://www.njemploymentlawfirmblog.com/fedeml-labor-laws-not-preempt-union-members-whistleblower-cla
im/ [http://perma.cc/7P9S-3UTG]; Lisa M. Noller & Bryan B. House, A Review of Recent Whistleblower
Developments,
FOLEY
&
LARDNER
LLP
(Oct.
19,
2017),
http://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2017/10/a-review-of-recent-whistleblower-developments
[http://perma.cc/Y6W6-MXPC].
170.
172.

§ 922 (codified
§ 1057(c)(4) (codified at

Dodd-Frank

171. Id.

§ 78u-6(h)).
§ 5567(c)(4)).

at 15 U.S.C.
12 U.S.C.

Bechtel v. Admin. Rev. Bd., U.S. Dep't of Lab., 710 F.3d 443, 449 (2d Cir. 2013); 15 U.S.C.

§ 78u-6.
173.

See Kwok, supra note 94, at 1237.

174. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1). The secretary of labor has delegated authority for the enforcement of
Section 806 to the assistant secretary for OSHA. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 806(a),
§ 1514A(b), 116 Stat. 745. Part C of this Section offers a short explanation for OSHA's role, but the focus of
this Part is on the intm-agency procedure an employee-whistleblower follows after having filed a complaint.
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OSHA regional or area office.17 5 Complaints do not require any particular form or
wording indeed, complaints can be submitted in any language.17 6
OSHA notifies the employer of the allegations in the complaint.177 These
allegations are redacted if necessary to protect the confidentiality of the employee. 17 8
The employer has a chance to respond with a written statement and may additionally
request a meeting to present its position.17 9 OSHA will dismiss the complaint "unless the
complainant has made a prima facie showing that a protected activity was a contributing
factor in the adverse action alleged in the complaint." 180 Next, the employer has a chance
to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that it "would have taken the same adverse
action in the absence of the complainant's protected activity." 181 If the employee has
made a prima facie showing of retaliation, and the employer has not met its burden of
showing that the action was not caused by the whistleblowing activity, then OSHA
conducts an investigation.18 2 In practice, these investigations have been plagued with
delays and understaffing, and there is reason to believe SOX claims raise special
problems for OSHA investigators. 8 3
Within sixty days of the filing of the complaint, OSHA's assistant secretary must
issue written findings. 184 If the assistant secretary concludes that there is reasonable
cause to believe a violation has occurred, the assistant secretary will accompany the
findings with a preliminary order providing relief to the complainant.185 The preliminary
order will include all relief necessary to make the employee whole. 18 6 If the assistant
secretary concludes that a violation has not occurred, they will notify the parties of that

finding. 187
These findings are confidential, protecting the identity of the whistleblower. I made
an unsuccessful Freedom of Information Act request in 2016 to try to obtain the

175.

OSHA,

OSHA FACT SHEET: FILING WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY

ACT
(n.d.),
http://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/publications/osha-factsheet-sox-act.pdf
[http://penna.cc/J6L3-YQXU] (last visited Feb. 1, 2022).
176. Id.; Whistleblower Laws Enforced by OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., http://www.whistleblowers.gov
[http://perma.cc/V7GR-7LSN] (last visited Feb. 1, 2022).
177.

29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(a) (2021).

178. Id.
179. Id. § 1980.104(b).
180. Id. § 1980.104(e)(1).
181. Id. § 1980.104(e)(4).
182. Id. § 1980.104(e)(5).
183. See Sarah N. Lynch, Wells Fargo Complaints Show Flaws in Federal Whistleblower Program,
REUTERS
(Oct.
13,
2016,
2:04
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-accounts-wistleblower-idUSKCN12D2M0
[http://perma.cc/5QSJ-4UXT].
184.

§ 1980.105(a)
§ 1980.105(a)(1).

29 C.F.R.

185. Id.

(2021).

186. Id. ("The preliminary order will include ...
reinstatement with the same seniority status that the
complainant would have had but for the retaliation; back pay with interest; and compensation for any special
damages sustained as a result of the retaliation, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorney fees.").
187. Id. § 1980.105(a)(2).
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underlying data for these initial complaints and findings. 188 Thus, information on
OSHA's initial determinations is not available. 18 9 However, in early 2020, OSHA began
making aggregate data available on its website. 190
Some readers may be wondering about the placement of financial-fraud
whistleblowing at OSHA, rather than a financial regulator such as the SEC. Part V.A will
describe the reason for housing financial-fraud whistleblowing in this unlikely location
and its rocky beginnings. For right now, it is enough to observe that, while OSHA was
ill-equipped at the outset to handle these SOX claims, it has developed expertise in this
area. Still, SOX cases consume a disproportionately high amount of OSHA resources. 191
The mismatch between agency and requirements of financial misconduct is a subject to
which we will return.
2.

Dodd-Frank

Besides enhancing SOX's protections, Dodd-Frank also includes separate
protections against whistleblower retaliation, creating a private right of action for
individuals to sue directly in the appropriate district court. 192 In contrast to SOX's
lengthy procedural requirements, Dodd-Frank's are relatively brief. Because it is a direct
cause of action, the statute contains no discussion of procedure. A plaintiff simply files
suit.
The reality is not so simple. Filing in federal court pro se requires a great deal of
work, as well as some money for court filings. Hiring a lawyer, or convincing one to
represent you on a contingent fee basis, takes additional resources. Most lawyers in this
area work on a contingent fee basis. 193 The presence of a lawyer thereby serves as a type
of screen because lawyers will generally only take cases they estimate to be worth what
can be a considerable upfront investment of time and money.
SOX and Dodd-Frank thus provide plaintiffs with a stark contrast in terms of
procedures for seeking relief from retaliation for their whistleblowing. SOX requires

188. The denial cited 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A), which protects records or information when disclosure
could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings; Exemption 6, release of the
information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; Exemption 7(A) protects from
disclosure records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be expected
to interfere with enforcement proceedings. Under Exemption 7(C), release of the information could reasonably
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption (7)(D) provides protection
for records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes which could reasonably be expected to
disclose the identity of a confidential source which furnished information on a confidential basis. Richard
Moberly received OSHA claims after a Freedom of Information Act request in 2006. Moberly, Unfulfilled
Expectations,supra note 137, at 87 n.111.
189.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A).

190. See Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), U.S. DEPT OF LAB., http://www.osha.gov/foia
[http://perma.cc/2N6P-T32S] (last visited Feb. 1, 2022).
191. See WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT, supra note 148, at
39-41 ("Officials and supervisors told us that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the statute on which specialized legal
assistance is most often needed .... ").

192.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).

193. How Contingency Fee Arrangements Empower Whistleblowers, SARRAF GENTILE (June 24, 2020),
http://www.sarrafgentile.com/how-contingency-fee-arrangements-empower-whistleblowers/
[http://perma.cc/X3R4-KJQ8].
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going through an elaborate administrative agency in order to obtain relief and may only
go outside agency adjudication in limited circumstances (namely once appeals have been
exhausted or if the agency is dilatory in its review). Yet the upfront costs are minimal. In
contrast, Dodd-Frank provides direct access to the courts although it requires, at least
after the Supreme Court clarified matters in 2018 in Digital Realty Trust, a plaintiff to
provide information relating to a violation of securities law to the SEC in order to be
eligible for relief.194 As importantly, successfully navigating the courts requires
whistleblowers to convince an attorney that their case is worth pursuing.
C.

Adjudication

Dodd-Frank gives whistleblowers a direct cause of action, meaning that they, or
their attorneys as agents, shoulder the task of determining which suits are likely to be
worth bringing. SOX, in contrast, tasks agency investigators with the initial sifting task.
Investigators need a master's or law degree, or an associate's or bachelor's degree
coupled with one year of experience in interpreting laws, regulations, or administrative
procedures, to assess compliance or discrimination. 195
On the other hand, federal district judges, all of whom have at least a law degree,
are the product of a rigorous Article III selection process. 196 District judges may therefore
be more trustworthy, reliable identifiers of meritorious claims than agency
investigators although seasoned OSHA investigators have the advantage of
specialization and expertise.
Table 1 below summarizes the distinctions between the two antiretaliation
whistleblowing regimes.

194.

See Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778 (2018).

195.

Job postings show applicants must have a GS-9 level qualifications. See Investigator Job, LENSA,
http://lensa.com/investigator-jobs/kansas-city/jd/aed227fld77dea52ffc08c1lcec2a2cb
[http://perma.cc/UZJ6-RCMY] (last visited Feb. 1, 2022).
196. See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R43762, THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR
U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS: AN OVERVIEW 8 (2016) ("It is a well-established practice,
however, that candidates for nomination to circuit and district court judgeships are rigorously evaluated for their
degree of professional qualification at successive points in the selection process.").

TABLE 1:

SOX AND DODD-FRANK

Subjec t mat te r

SOX

Dodd-Frank
7/22/2010-6/30/2019
Court filing

No

Yes (post-2018)

External reporting
re uirement

Statute of limitations

Damages
Initial sorter
Adtudicator of appeal
Burden of proof

ANTIRETALIATION REGIME DISTINCTIONS

1/1/2003-9/5/2019
Simple report, oral or written
Mail fraud, wire fraud, bank
fraud, securities fraud

Cate o01
Time period
Ease of filing claim

D.
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Securities fraud

180 days (90 days re-2010)

6 years

Reinstatement, back pay,
attorneys' fees, litigation
costs, expert witness fees
OSHA Investigator

Reinstatement, 2x back pay,
attorneys' fees, litigation
costs, expert witness fees
Plaintiff/Attorney

ALJ

District Judge

Whistleblowing activity was
a "contributing factor" for
adverse action

Whistleblowing activity was
a "but-for factor" for
adverse action

Dodd-FrankWhistleblower Tips

Moving from the antiretaliation context that has occupied us thus far, this Part turns
from protection to incentivization to the bounty-style award system Dodd-Frank
created. Note that here, while dealing with an agency-mediated system rather than the
pure qui tam of the False Claims Act, we shift agencies from OSHA to the SEC.
Would-be claimants begin the whistleblowing process by submitting tips on a
standard form either through the SEC's online portal or by mailing or faxing them on
Form TCR to the OWP, 197 a separate division within the SEC that handles these tips. 198
All whistleblowing tips implicating securities violations are evaluated by an office in the
199
SEC's enforcement division.
The SEC evaluates the tips for "high-quality information" that justifies "the
additional allocation of Commission resources." 200 Some tips are forwarded to another
division within the SEC with particular expertise. 201 If the tip relates to an existing
investigation, it is forwarded to staff working on that investigation. 202 And if warranted,
the SEC will open a new investigation based on the tip. 203 The SEC's guidance advises
that tips that are "specific, credible, and timely, and that are accompanied by
corroborating documentary evidence" are most likely to be forwarded to the next stage
of the process. 2 04

197.

See 17 C.F.R.

198.

See id.

§ 240.21F-9(a) (2021).

199. SEC, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 4, 8. This point will be important later-not all
whistleblower reports filed at OSHA are communicated to the SEC. See infra note 310 and accompanying text.
200.

SEC, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 31.

201.

Id.

202. Id.
203.

Id.

204.

Id. at 32.
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Not all of these forwarded tips will bear financial fruit for the tipper, however.
Tippers will only receive an award if the government collects at least one million dollars
in monetary sanctions. 2 5 The process of obtaining an award, in this limited set of cases,
is a somewhat convoluted one. Once an SEC enforcement action has resulted in over one
million dollars in sanctions, the agency posts a Notice of Covered Action on its
website. 206 Once this notice is posted, whistleblowers have ninety days to apply for their
share of the award. 207
The OWP, in consultation with the SEC investigators who led the enforcement
action, evaluates the claims to determine the contribution or involvement of the
whistleblower. OWP attorneys then make a recommendation as to whether the claimant
meets the criteria for an award, and the amount of an award. This process has recently
been reformed, as described in Part V.B. For now, it is enough to observe that the SEC
looks at positive factors, including the significance of the information provided, the law
enforcement interests at stake, the level of the whistleblower's assistance, and whether
the whistleblower first reported the misconduct internally. 208 Factors that decrease an
award include the whistleblower's own culpability, including whether he "financially
benefited from the misconduct, interfered with internal compliance systems, or
unreasonably delayed in reporting the violation to the Commission. 209 The SEC then
issues a Preliminary Determination, and the whistleblower has a limited amount of time
to review the record, request reconsideration, and in some cases, appeal.21 0
E.

QualitativeData on Attorney Compensation

Turning from this general description of whistleblower regimes relating to federal
financial misconduct, in order to paint a clearer picture of these claims, I interviewed
seven attorneys, both in small and large firms from around the United States. Some of
these attorneys work on whistleblower bounty cases and others work in antiretaliation.
The latter classify themselves as employment lawyers, although all reported doing some
qui tam work.
These interviews reveal that the norm for most representation is to work on a
contingent fee basis. One lawyer reported sometimes employing a "hybrid" model, where
the client would pay a reduced hourly rate and the lawyer would recover a lower

205.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1).

206. SEC, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 6, 19. Whistleblowers can sign up to receive updates
whenever a new Notice of Covered Action is posted. Id. at 19.
207. Id. at 20. "Only claimants who have a clear nexus between the information they provided to the
Commission and the charges in the underlying action should apply for an award." Id. Claimants are urged to
consider whether they communicated with the SEC enforcement staff who brought the action and review the
relationship between the information the claimant provided and the specific charges the SEC brought. Id.
208.

See id. at21.

209. Id.
210. See id.; 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(b)(1). There is no appeal unless outside the 10-30% of the sanctions.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1842
(2010).
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percentage of the recovery in any settlement or adjudication on the merits. 2 11 But in all
cases, the attorneys I spoke with were operating on some type of contingent fee.
All attorneys reported being extremely selective in accepting cases. One
interviewee broke down evaluation of a case into two components: liability and
damages. 212 Echoing the process of other attorneys, he cited the importance of gathering
information to see if the plaintiff could meet the basic elements of a whistleblowing
claim. 213 Several attorneys cited the importance of written documentation of the
whistleblowing. As important as concrete evidence was causation, the need to tie the
adverse employment action to the whistleblowing activity.
But beyond the merits of the particular case, each attorney who worked with
whistleblower cases admitted the importance of potential damages in assessing the
claim a calculation which necessarily favors well-compensated clients. Attorneys
214
mentioned general counsels, CEOs, and CFOs as strong potential claimants.
A final point several lawyers emphasized was the strategic importance of
pre-litigation (or prefiling with OSHA for a SOX claim) practice. 215 If the whistleblower
consults an attorney early on (remember SOX's 180-day statute of limitations), then the
attorney will first assemble the facts, frame the plaintiff's case, and send a letter outlining
that case to the corporation as a prelude to settlement negotiations. Similar preparation
occurs before the filing of a tip with the SEC seeking a whistleblowing award. 216
Especially when it comes to high-level executives or general counsels, this route
preserves confidentiality for both employee and employer.
These cases can be strong on the merits and never be filed with a court or agency.
Precisely because of their strength, employers are anxious to settle. Settlement also can
work to the advantage of the employee. Beyond a monetary settlement, the agreement
may contain nondisparagement provisions and the requirement of customary letters of
reference to aid a fired employee in seeking new employment. These post-retaliation
settlements underline the "shadow" whistleblower protection laws cast, far larger effects
than those we see in courts or administrative proceedings. 217
We have summarized the landscape and literature of whistleblowing. This Part
described the statutory framework and provided the perspective of attorneys who work
with whistleblowers every day. Section IV will describe empirical findings relating to
three different design mechanisms.

211. Telephone Interview with Attorney I (Jan. 23, 2020); see also Telephone Interview with Attorney
III (Jan. 28, 2020); Telephone Interview with Attorney VII (Jan. 28, 2020).
212.

Telephone Interview with Attorney VII (Jan. 28, 2020).

213.

Id.

214.

Id.; Telephone Interview with Attorney III (Jan. 28, 2020).

215.

Telephone Interview with Attorney IV (Jan. 28, 2020).

216.

Telephone Interview with Attorney I (Jan. 23, 2020).

217. See generallyRobert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The
Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing how the law can impact the way actors behave outside of
the legal system, using divorce negotiations as an example).
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IV.

DATA

I constructed three datasets. The first focuses
on agency-mediated
tips Dodd-Frank's cash for tips bounty-style program. The second and third shift to the
antiretaliation side of enforcement and examine data from two different contexts: SOX's
agency-based remedy and Dodd-Frank's litigation-based method of redress. The datasets
reveal clear distinctions in the success rates of the plaintiffs who navigate these three
regimes. The least successful, in terms of numbers, is the first.
A.

Bounty-Style Awards (Dodd-Frank)

The first data we turnto concern the tip-based, government-mediated bounty model
Dodd-Frank introduced, housed at the SEC. Federal law requires the SEC to make an
annual whistleblower report.218 I mined these annual reports for data on tips. 219 The SEC
trumpets the success of its awards in these reports, its press releases, and on its website. 220

§ 78u-7(d).

218.

15 U.S.C.

219.

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM

(2011), http://www.sec.gov/files/wistleblower-annual-report-2011.pdf
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK

[http://perma.cc/V4H4-ZCN3];
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM

U.S.

(2012),

http://www.sec.gov/files/annual-report-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/BF4W-2AFZ]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
2013

ANNUAL

REPORT

TO

CONGRESS

ON THE

DODD-FRANK

WHISTLEBLOWER

PROGRAM

(2013),

http://www.sec.gov/files/annual-report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/SMM6-DVEJ]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
2014

ANNUAL

REPORT

TO

CONGRESS

ON THE DODD-FRANK

WHISTLEBLOWER

PROGRAM

(2014),

http://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annual-report-2014_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/JA8G-CB4W]; U.S. SEC. & ExCH.
COMM'N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2015),

http://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf

[http://perma.cc/UJ93-WJL9];

U.S. SEC.

& EXCH.

COMM'N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2016),

http://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annual-report-2016.pdf
COMM'N,

2017

ANNUAL

REPORT

TO

[http://perma.cc/56D6-NZRQ];
CONGRESS

WHISTLEBLOWER

https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-annual-report-wistleblower-progmm.pdf

U.S. SEC. & ExCH.
PROGRAM

(2017),

[http://perma.cc/3H5H-2L6M];

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2018),

http://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2018-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf

[http://perma.cc/3N37-6THN];

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2019),

http://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2019-annualo20report-whistleblowet %20program.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SL39-PRAK].
220. For example, on October 22, 2020, the SEC announced its largest ever award, amounting to
approximately $114 million. Press Release, SEC No. 2020-266, SEC Issues Record $114 Million Whistleblower
Award (Oct. 22, 2020), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-266 [http://perma.cc/EFV5-89WM] ("The
combined $114 million reward marks the highest award in the program's history, and eclipses the next highest
award of $50 million made to an individual in June 2020. 'Today's milestone award is a testament to the
Commission's commitment to award whistleblowers who provide the agency with high-quality
information' .... " (quoting SEC Chairman Jay Clayton)); see also Press Release, SEC No. 2018-44, SEC
Announces
Its
Largest-Ever
Whistleblower
Awards
(Mar.
19,
2018),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-44
[http://perma.cc/6T27-7FA8]; Press Release, SEC No.
2018-179, SEC Awards More Than $54 Million to Two Whistleblowers (Sept. 6, 2018),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-179 [http://perma.cc/XPC7-ZZRC]; Press Release, SEC No.
2016-237,
SEC
Issues
$20
Million
Whistleblower
Award
(Nov.
14,
2016),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-237.html [http://perma.cc/RY4Y-MZR5]; SEC, 2018 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS: WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 9 (2018) [hereinafter SEC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT],

http://www.sec.gov/sec-2018-annual-report-wistleblower-progmm.pdf
[http://perma.cc/A7UT-CD3H] ("The
Commission's $83 million award in March 2018 included an almost $50 million joint award to two individuals,
which is also the Commission's highest award to date, as well as an award of $33 million to a third individual.
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The numbers tell a different story. To take one year as an example, in 2018, the
SEC received over 5,200 tips. 221 It paid out awards to 13 individuals. 222 This mismatch
between number of tips received and payouts authorized in 2018 is no anomaly. The
difference between tips received and awards made for earlier years is equally stark. Over
4,400 tips were received in 2017 and only 12 individuals received awards. 223 Similarly,
over 4,200 tips were received in 2016 and only 13 individuals received awards. 224 The
payouts in each year were substantial $168 million in 2018, $50 million in 2017, and
$57 million in 2016 especially considering the relatively low number of individuals
who shared those totals. 225
The percentage of successful tips has thus been remarkably low. Excluding the first
year of reporting (when there was only one award), it has moved from a low of 0.12% in
2013 to a high of 0.81% in 2016.226 The average success rate in years 2013-2020 is
0.33%. It is fair to say that, while the SEC ballyhoos its Office of the Whistleblower,
actual awards though sometimes substantial appear to be few and far between. 227
Among such tips is surely a lot of noise.
One potential objection to looking at awards and tips in this fashion is that one
cannot draw a linear connection between tips and resulting awards in any given year. A
tip made to the SEC in 2018 might not lead to a government recovery and a subsequent
agency determination of a whistleblower award until years later. Indeed, one
accomplished and highly reputed whistleblower attorney argued this very point in an
interview. 228
Another potential issue is that the number of awards underestimates the value of
the program to the government. The SEC's 2020 annual report states that it is tracking
"over 1,100 matters" where a tip has caused an investigation to be opened or been
relevant to an ongoing investigation. 229 Furthermore, given the labyrinth an
award-claiming whistleblower must navigate (described in Part III.D) there may be
eligible claimants who fail to receive an award.
Still, the chances of a single tip leading to an award are infinitesimally low. Perhaps
in acknowledgement of this state of affairs, in 2018, the SEC began to deemphasize the

The Commission also made a $54 million award in September 2018, with a $39 million award to one individual,
and a $15 million award to a second individual.").
221.

SEC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 2, 20.

222. Id. at 1, 9.
223.

SEC, 2017 WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2017) [hereinafter 2017

WHISTLEBLOWER

ANNUAL

REPORT],

http://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-annual-report-wistleblower-progmm.pdf [http://perma.cc/JUX4-HC5P].
224. SEC, 2016 DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2016)
[hereinafter 2016 WHISTLEBLOWER ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annual-report-2016.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DU6Y-AHQK].
225.

SEC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 1; 2017 WHISTLEBLOWER ANNUAL REPORT, supra

note 223, at 1; 2016 WHISTLEBLOWER ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 224, at 1.
226. Miriam Baer found a "hit rate" ofjust under 0.2% for the first five years of the program. Baer, supra
note 49, at 2217.
227. See, e.g., SEC, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that over 6,900 tips were received
in 2020, but awards were only issued to thirty-nine individuals).
228.

Telephone Interview with Attorney I (Jan. 23, 2020).

229.

SEC, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 31.
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whistleblower bounty program. The agency proposed scaling back on whistleblower
awards above $100 million. 23 In a move some attributed to the proposed reform, 2019
saw a drop in whistleblower tips, down 1% from 2018, the largest drop being in tips
about potential fraud in securities offerings. 231 The proposed rules also gave the
Commission discretion to make awards to people who would not qualify under the
current one million dollar minimum, as well as discretion to adjust rewards upwards. 232
Section V will return to these proposed rules, some of which the SEC ultimately
adopted in September 2020, which present a case study on the problem of reforming
whistleblower protection without examining the basic questions set forth at the outset of
this Article. For now, this Part moves to the next two datasets, and in doing so pivots
from the bounty mechanism to two methods of protecting whistleblowers from
retaliation.
TABLE 2: TIPS AND AWARDS iN THE SEC 2012-2020

Total Dollar
Amount (S)

Number
of AN aris

Percentage of
AN aris to Ti s (%)

3,001

1

0.03

50,000

3,238

4

0.12

14,000,000

2014

3,620

9

0.25

30,000,000

2015

3,923

8

0.20

37,000,000

2016
2017

4,218
4,484

13
12

0.31
0.27

57,000,000
50,000,000

2018
2019
2020
Average
(excluding

5,282
5,212
6,911

13
8
39

0.25
0.15
0.56

168,000,000
60,000,000
175,000,000

4,611

13

0.28

74,000,000

Year

Number
of Tips

2012
2013

2012)

B.

AntiretaliationData (SOX and Dodd-Frank)

The first antiretaliation mechanism focuses on OSHA's initial investigatory
decisions; the second focuses on lawsuits filed in court alleging claims under
Dodd-Frank. The datasets do not pull from the same universe of potential claims; as
described above, Dodd-Frank and SOX protect whistleblowers, but in different ways and
in different, but overlapping, fields. Indeed, whistleblowers can have both SOX and

230. See Whistleblower Program Rules, supra note 29; see also Henry Cutter, SEC Seeks Right To Cut
Whistleblower
Bounties,
WALL
ST.
J.
(June
29,
2018,
9:00
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-proposes-whistleblower-awards-for-smaller-cases-1530212390?mod=article_
inline [http://perma.cc/UZ98-ER2J].
231. See Kristin Broughton & Dylan Tokar, SEC Whistleblower Tips Decline as Agency Looks To Limit
Big
Awards,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
15,
2019,
7:35
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wistleblower-tips-decline-as-agency-looks-to-limit-big-awards-1157386450
0 [http://perma.cc/Q73B-VKZY].
232.

Cutter, supra note 230.
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Dodd-Frank claims arising from the same protected conduct in fact, many of them
do. 233
These data do not permit direct comparison. Yet these data constitute the only
concrete findings we have on how whistleblowing works in financial-fraud cases in the
United States. They reveal a notable difference in success rate. This Part thus casts light
on how different sifting mechanisms work in real life.
1.

SOX (OSHA)

The Department of Labor publishes aggregate OSHA whistleblower complaint data
on its Office of the Whistleblower website. 2 3 4 Data are available from 2008 to 2020,235
but this Article's sample period spans 2012 to 2020, overlapping with the time span of
the OWP award dataset. 236
In terms of process, OSHA investigators are assigned complaints to be
investigated. 237 The investigator works with the complainant during the intake and
evaluation phase of the investigation, 238 conducts on-site interviews, and collects
documentary evidence whenever practicable. 239 The investigator also contacts the
employer for interviews, records, and other matters. 2 40 After investigators have gathered
the available relevant evidence, they make a determination and consult with their
supervisor. 2 4 1 The supervisor reviews the file and either approves it or, if the supervisor
does not agree with the investigator's analysis, returns the file for follow up work. 2 4 2
Regional administrators have overall responsibility for all whistleblower investigations
in their regions. 24 3

233. See Daniel J. Hurson, Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank,Retaliation,and Reward: Representing Clients
in the Age of the Whistleblower, 32 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 381, 406 (2017); Jay Fishman, Whistleblowers 2d
Cir.: DischargedEmployee Survives Prima Facie Inquiry To Defeat Summary Judgment, WOLTERS KLUWER
EMP. L. DAILY, 2016 WL 7403928 (2016); Joanne Cursinella, No Second Shot for Bio-Rad at Whistleblower
Claim As Motion To Relitigate Is Denied, CORP. GOVERNANCE GUIDE 2255235 (C.C.H.), 2017 WL 2255235
(2017); Nicolas Morgan & Grant Alexander, Does Your Babysitter Qualfyfor Whistleb lower Protection Without
Reporting Directly to the SEC?, 22 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 1, 27 (2014).
234. Data and Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., http://www.whistleblowers.gov/factsheets_page/statistics
[http://perma.cc/2NGX-399G] (last visited Feb. 1, 2022).
235.

Internet archives provided the data from 2008-2018. OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WHISTLEBLOWER

DOCKETED

CASES

RECEIVED:

FY2008

-

FY2018,

http://www.whistleblowers.gov/sites/default/files/3DCharts-FY2008-FY2018.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9GAJ-JTJX].
236. The Department of Labor's Office of the Whistleblower website provides aggregate data from
2015-2020. OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WHISTLEBLOWER DOCKETED CASES RECEIVED: FY2015 - FY2020,
http://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/3D_Charts-ReceivedClosed.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6JW-YDYF].
237.

OSHA,

U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS

[hereinafter

WHISTLEBLOWER

INVESTIGATIONS

http://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/directives/CPL_02-03-007.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LEE2-QPZN].
238.

Id. at 3-2, 3-13.

239.

Id. at 3-15.

240.

Id. at 3-21.

241.

See id at 3-22.

242.

See id. at 4-2, 4-6.

243.

Id. at 1-8, 1-9.

MANUAL 3-2, 3-9

(2016)

MANUAL],
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T\BLE 3: SOX DOCKETED AND COMPLETED CASES 2012-20204
Year

SOX Docketed
Cases

SOX Cases
Com leted

2012

170

157

2013

179

200

2014

146

171

2015

156

149

2016

174

170

2017

186

200

2018

155

163

2019

125

144

2020

143

144

OSHA classifies the data on the cases that it investigates into six categories: merit,
settled, settled other, dismissed, kickout, and withdrawn.245 The Whistleblowers
Investigations Manual provides the following explanations 24 6:
Merit. Cases found to have merit must have been approved by a supervisor and by
the regional solicitor of labor, an attorney, who will litigate the case if it does not settle. 2 4 7
Settled. OSHA views voluntary resolution of cases to be "desirable" and encourages
investigators to "actively assist" the parties in resolving their case. 248 OSHA has its own
standard settlement agreement and procedures in place for settlement. 24 9 Parties can also

244. The Department of Labor's Office of the Whistleblower website provides aggregate data from
2015-2020. OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WHISTLEBLOWER DOCKETED CASES RECEIVED: FY2015 - FY2020,
supra note 236.
245.

See WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, supra note 237,

at 4-1-4-6.

246. See id. at 1-13, 4-1-4-6 (describing categorizations of whistleblower complaint data). OSHA screens
out whistleblower complaints under some statutes and reports those data separately. Id. at 2-3, 2-4. Screened out
cases are administratively closed. Id. Per OSHA policy, no SOX cases may be screened out for untimeliness or
lack of a prima facie allegation; they must be docketed and dismissed after a determination is made. Id. at 2-4,

2-5 ("Complaints filed under STAA, CAA, CERCLA, FWPCA, SDWA, SWDA, TSCA, ERA, AIR21, SOX,
PSIA, NTSSA, FRSA, CPSIA, ACA, CFPA, or FSMA that are either untimely or do not present a primafacie
allegation, may not be 'screened out' or closed administratively. Complaints filed under these statutes must be
docketed and a written determination issued, unless the complainant, having received an explanation of the
situation, withdraws the complaint.").
247. Id. at 1-8, 3-5 ("Under the reasonable cause standard, OSHA must believe, after evaluating all of the
evidence gathered in the investigation from the respondent, the complainant, and other witnesses or sources, that
a reasonable judge could rule in favor of the complainant. The threshold OSHA must meet to find reasonable
cause that a complaint has merit requires evidence in support of each element of a violation and consideration
of the evidence provided by both sides or otherwise gathered during the investigation, but does not generally
require as much evidence as would be required at trial. Because OSHA makes its reasonable cause determination
prior to a hearing, the reasonable cause standard is somewhat lower than the preponderance of the evidence
standard that applies following a hearing.").
248.

Id. at 4-3.

249. Id.
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negotiate settlements on their own.250 While these must be reviewed and approved by the
supervisor, OSHA's policy is to "defer to adequate privately-negotiated settlements. 2 51
Settled Other. Cases that fall within the "settled other" category are cases that were
deferred from OSHA to another agency, grievance proceeding, or arbitration, and
subsequently settled.252
Dismissed. A recommendation to dismiss the case requires that OSHA issues
findings to the complainant and respondent. The recommendation "must include the
rationale for the decision" as well as information regarding the parties' rights to object
or appeal after 180 days. 253
Kicked-Out. "Kicked-out" cases are cases in which the complainant exercises his
or her right to remove their case to the federal district court.254
Withdrawn. Complainants can withdraw at any time during the process. 255 A
complainant who withdraws forfeits all rights to appeal or object. 256
Positive Outcome for Complainant. OSHA classifies merit, settled, and settled
other as positive outcomes for complainant. 257 I adhere to the agency classification of
positive outcomes, as further explained later in this Part.

250.

Id. at 6-18.

251. Id.
252. See id. at 4-5. In cases where the investigator recommends a deferral to another agency's decision,
grievance proceeding, arbitration, or other appropriate action, the supervisor will issue letters of deferral to the
complainant and respondent. The case will be considered closed at the time of the deferral and will be recorded
in Integrated Management Information System as "Dismissed." Id. If the other proceeding results in a settlement,
it will be recorded as "Settled Other." Id.
253.

See id. at 4-3.

254. See Memorandum from Francis Yebesi, Acting Dir. of Whistleblower Prot. Programs, to Regional
Adm'rs and Whistleblower Program Managers on the Clarification of Procedures for Closing Investigations
Based
on
a
"Kick-Out"
to
Federal
District
Court
(Jan.
26,
2018),
http://www.wistleblowers.gov/memo/2018-01-26 [http://perma.cc/5AWT-M5Z9].
255.

WHISTLEBLOWER

INVESTIGATIONS

256. Id.
257.

See id. at 1-13, 4-1-4-6.

MANUAL, supra note 237,

at 4-2.
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TABLE 4: COUNTS OF SOX WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINT DETERMINATIONS 2012-2020

2

11

29

42l

9U

IU

165

IOU

2
2
1
1
7
3
1
0
19

9
3
2
7
5
5
6
8
56

29
29
20
27
35
27
15
27
238

40
34
23
35
47
35
22
35
313

141
77
82
77
102
92
92
75
828

25
30
20
31
16
16
15
22
185

44
33
30
30
37
20
19
12
243

250
174
155
173
202
163
148
144
1569

TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE OF

SOX WHISTLEBLOWER
2012-2020

COMPLAINT DETERMINATIONS

1.3

O.y

165.1

20.5

J)OiS

0.3

11ii

IUU.U

0.8

3.6
1.7
1.3
4.0
2.5
3.1
4.1
5.6
3.6

11.6
16.7
12.9
15.6
17.3
16.6
10.1
18.8
15.2

16.0
19.5
14.8
20.2
23.3
21.5
14.9
24.3
19.9

56.4
44.3
52.9
44.5
50.5
56.4
62.2
52.1
52.8

10.0
17.2
12.9
17.9
7.9
9.8
10.1
15.3
11.8

17.6
19.0
19.4
17.3
18.3
12.3
12.8
8.3
15.5

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

1.1
0.6
0.6
3.5
1.8
0.7
0.0
1.2
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TABLE 6: SOX WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINT DETERMINATIONS SUMMARY STATISTICS

2012-2020

2.1

6.2

26.4

34.8

92.0

20.6

27.0

174.3

Average

1.2

3.6

15.2

19.9

52.8

11.8

15.5

100.0

Rnge

0-7

Rie822-11

15-35

22-47

141

1031

1.36.9

10.118.8

14.926.3

44.362.2

6.317.2

Raw,

Range

12-44
8.319.4

144250

N/A

Recall Richard Moberly found a 3.6% win rate at the initial OSHA investigation
level and a 6.5% win rate at the ALJ level, excluding settlements in each case.2 5 1 I include
Moberly's early data for comparison. Investigators find for SOX complainants 1.2% of
the time. This is an extremely small percentage, even as compared to what Moberly finds
in his initial study of investigations from 2003 to 2005.
TABLE 7: PERCENTAGE OF SOX FINDINGS FOR PLAINTIFFS ON THE MERITS

As already observed, any discussion of sorting meritorious from meritless claims
requires defining merit. So far I have used a plaintiff's outright win as a signal of merit.
This test certainly has intuitive appeal. Perhaps if OSHA investigators made a finding in
each and every case a complainant filed, plaintiff success or failure in these cases might
fairly be thought to capture merit. But many cases do not reach that point many cases
settle. 259 In the OSHA sample, 294 out of 1,569 or 18.7% of the total-settled.2 60
Scholars have grappled with how to characterize settlements in empirical studies
before. As Wendy Parker points out, "[s]ettlements do not fit neatly into the categories
of win or loss.=261 As Theodore Eisenberg and others have explored, cases that are

258. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 137, at 91. In the six years following Moberly's initial
study, only ten whistleblowers won a case in front of OSHA, making the cumulative percentage of successful
claimants from the Act's enactment through 2012 1.8% (of 1,260 cases OSHA decided). Moberly, Ten Years
Later, supra note 51, at 28-29.
259.

See supra Part I.B.1 Table 4.

260.

See supra Part I.B.1 Table 4.

261. Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
889, 909 (2006). Because plaintiffs rarely win in employment discrimination cases, Parker "defined plaintiffs'
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litigated to conclusion constitute a biased sample. 26 2 Disputes that heavily favor one side
or the other "tend to settle readily, because both sides can save costs by settling in light
of their knowledge of the applicable law and all other aspects of the case. 263 Litigants
only resort to trial when they have differing expectations of a trial outcome. 264
Settlements are the product of compromise, but if that compromise tilts a certain
way, the direction is hard to determine. 265 Risk-averse defendants, particularly those
eyeing a jury award and the risk of a double pay award, are much more likely to settle
for a relatively high dollar value. 266 These latter cases are not meritless claims 267 far
from it. Rather, the fact of a settlement is an indicium of a claim's merit.
But a settlement is not an unambiguous marker of merit. If both parties recognize
the case is weak, the plaintiffs may be willing to abandon the case early on rather than
shoulder the burden of paying litigation costs on a losing case. 268 The result here can also
be a settlement, although a relatively small-dollar one, reflecting the weakness of the
case. It could be that plaintiffs receive a nominal token amount and compromise their

claims considerably .269
With these caveats and complications in mind, this Part counts settlements as
favorable outcomes for plaintiffs. Supporting this position is the fact that OSHA itself
groups cases that are "settled" and "settled other" as positive outcomes for
whistleblowers. 270 Recall that "settled other" cases settle after being arbitrated or
investigated in another forum or agency. 271
In the total Department of Labor dataset, 18.7% of the cases settle. 272 If we combine
cases that settle with those where the plaintiff is successful, we find that plaintiffs win or
settle a total of 313 out of 1,569 times, or 19.95% of the time. 273 With this overview of
the SOX data, we can turn to the final mechanism for whistleblower protection: litigation
under Dodd-Frank.

wins broadly to capture as many cases as possible. For tried cases, whether by jury or bench, plaintiffs' victories
are the awarding of any relief, whether it be injunctive or monetary." Id.
262. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About
the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 588 (1998); Theodore
Eisenberg, LitigationModels and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and PrisonerCases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1568
(1989).
263.

Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 262, at 588.

264.

See Eisenberg, supra note 262, at 1571.

265.

See Parker, supra note 261, at 909-10.

266.

See Eisenberg, supra note 262, at 1571.

267. See Parker, supra note 261, at 909-10 (explaining that plaintiffs almost always receive something
for giving up their claims).
268.

See Eisenberg, supra note 262, at 1571.

269.

Parker, supra note 261, at 909-10.

270.

See WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, supra note 237, at 1-13, 4-1-4-6.

271.

See id. at 4-5; see also supra note 252 and accompanying text.

272.

See infra Part IV.C Table 10.

273.

See infra Part IV.C Table 10.
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Dodd-Frank (Court Cases)

The third dataset, comprised of Dodd-Frank antiretaliation claims, was compiled
by Shepardizing the Dodd-Frank statute referring to antiretaliation protections. 27 4 Coders
first assessed whether the case was applicable to the research question. Reasons for it
being inapplicable included that no Dodd-Frank claim was alleged, that there was no
employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, or that the Dodd-Frank claim was not discussed because the
preliminary motions dealt with other issues. 275 The time period analyzed was from
January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2020,276 and contained 187 observations in all.
Sixty-four were not applicable to the research question. 277
Of the 123 Dodd-Frank cases in the sample, 83 had the Dodd-Frank claims
dismissed and 39 had Dodd-Frank claims proceed. One was deferred. Sixty-five cases
had Dodd-Frank claims dismissed in favor of the defendant. Of these, five were for
retroactivity or statute of limitations reasons. Eleven of them were dismissed in favor of
arbitration. In three, the court affirmatively determined that the employee was terminated
for substandard performance. Thus, the success rate for plaintiffs was 39 in 122 (omitting
the deferred case), or 3 2 %.
TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF DODD-FRANK CASES

Dodd-Frank Cases
Outcome

Proceeded
Dismissed in favor of
defendant
Dismissed for arbitration
Retroactivity/SOL
Total
C.

(#)

(%)

39
67

32
55

11

9

5

4

122

100

Comparisons

The question of the relative efficacy of the sifting mechanisms is one these data
cannot definitely answer given the differences in causes of action. With that caveat firmly
in mind, it remains instructive to see the relative number of meritorious claims each
system produces. These data, despite their drawbacks, do offer empirical evidence that
offers a richer picture of the whistleblowing landscape.

274.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.

275.

See infra Appendix A for the full codebook.

276. Dodd-Frank's effective date was July 21, 2010. I exclude 2010 as a partial year and 2011 because
only three cases meeting our criteria were filed that year, presumably because the cause of action was so new.
277. Either they did not contain a Dodd-Frank claim, the parties agreed to dismiss the Dodd-Frank claim,
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, or the Dodd-Frank claim was not discussed because other
preliminary motions were at issue.
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TABLE 9: PERCENTAGE OF

SOX

AND DODD-FRANK SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS FROM

ADJUDICATED CLAIMS

Percentagae of wNhole
SOX

1.2

Dodd-Frank

32.0

On their own, these numbers suggest that empowering plaintiffs to pursue their own
claims (as Dodd-Frank does) generates a relatively higher proportion of meritorious
whistleblower claims (32%) than does giving an agency sole and complete jurisdiction
(1.2%). That is, it would seem that the agency model produces substantial "noise" or
"nuisance value" claims, even though potential damages are lower than under
Dodd-Frank. 278 Whether either regime is "better" is an open question, one that depends
on a prior expectation of what an optimal rate would be and, importantly, on how many
meritorious suits each side has weeded out. Part V.C will explore these questions further.
As Section II made clear, however, there are strong arguments for including
settlements in any evaluation of a sifting mechanism. 279 Table 10 includes settlement
data for the agency cases. Note our focus here is with how each sorting mechanism
performs at a decision point, i.e., after an opinion has issued (in the case of SOX, when
it has entered the agency's system; in the case of Dodd-Frank, after there has been an
adjudication). Pretrial settlements are thus not a part of the Dodd-Frank dataset.
TABLE 10: SUMMARY OF

Category
P wins (%)
D

wins (%)

Settlement %)
P wins (including9
settlement for SOX) (%)

SOX AND DODD-FRANK

- SOX DoddSOX
Frank
1.2
32.0

REGIMES

Dodd-Frank Bounty
Pro-ram
0.33

56.2

66.36

N/A

18.7

N/A

N/A

~

Recall that one argument is that pretrial litigation costs imposed on litigants means
that only those securely convinced of their merit will risk a lawsuit under a direct cause
of action.280 Under this view, there would be a higher percentage of meritorious claims
under Dodd-Frank. Indeed, the data reveal a roughly 60% higher success rate for
Dodd-Frank claims litigated in court as opposed to SOX claims filed with an

278.

See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 137, at 97.

279. While the Dodd-Frank court case data do not include cases that settle before the issuance of an
opinion, subsequent case history allowed us to determine settlements in some of the cases. The data show that
twelve out of thirty-nine of successful plaintiffs, or 30.8%, settle after the issuance of the opinion. Two cases
with unsuccessful plaintiffs also settled.
280.

See, e.g., supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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administrative agency over the same period (19.95% vs. 32.00%). And both of these
success rates dwarf the average success rate for whistleblower tips of 0.28%.
These comparisons are not perfect. For one, the decisionmaker in Dodd-Frank cases
is an Article III judge, a far more vetted and credentialed individual than an OSHA
investigator. On the other hand, an agency investigator will have the benefit of
specialization. The SEC's team of investigators and lawyers likewise have this advantage
of specialization. A limitation of this cross-regime comparison is that it must, by its
nature, take these different sorting mechanisms at face value, presuming that they are
sorting accurately-or at least with consistent levels of inaccuracy. Relaxing this
assumption perforce lessens the utility of the comparison.
With this caveat in mind, an efficiency-minded reformer might purport to know
exactly what to do with these data. It appears that Dodd-Frank's court-based sorting
mechanism results in the highest percentage of successful claims, higher than SOX's
agency-based method, and much higher than Dodd-Frank's bounty mechanism, which
generates thousands of tips and only a handful of awards for its pains. 281
What this purportedly efficiency-minded reformer is forgetting are this Article's
central questions: How much whistleblowing is optimal? And how many meritless
claims are we willing to tolerate in order to reach that optimal level? This Section gave
us concrete data to think about when answering these questions in three different
regime-design contexts. Section V will examine past whistleblowing reforms, which
failed to consider our central questions, in light of what we have learned in this Section.
It concludes with a framework for future decisionmakers.
V.

PAST MISTAKES AND FUTURE PRESCRIPTIONS

Congress legislated in emotion-laden settings to create its two financial
whistleblower regimes SOX in response to the scandals of Enron and WorldCom, 282
and Dodd-Frank in response to the 2008 financial crisis. 2 83 It has never carefully
considered the tradeoffs involved in whistleblower protection. Similarly, the recent SEC
reforms duck these basic questions as to what kinds of whistleblowing we want to
incentivize and how best we can do so. 2 8 4 This Section offers two examples, one from
Congress and one from the SEC, that show how little attention these questions have
received. It then moves to normative prescriptions.

281.

See supra Part IV.C Table 10.

282.

SOX responded to internal whistleblowers Sherron Watkins (Enron) and Cynthia Cooper

(WorldCom). See Greg Farrell, WorldCom's Whistleblower Tells Her Story, ABC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2008, 8:38
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=4295223&page=1 [http://perma.cc/NZ7K-RRNP]; Associated
Press, Enron Whistleblower Tells of 'Crooked Company', NBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2006, 12:02 PM),

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ll839694/ns/business-corporate_scandals/t/enron-whistleblower-tells-crooked-co
mpany/#.XjmaiC2ZNQI [http://perma.cc/4S48-EVAT].
283. See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks of the President on Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-regulatory-reform
[http://perma.cc/9QZG-VMRY] ("[T]oday, my administration is proposing a sweeping overhaul of the financial
regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed the Great Depression.").
284.

See analysis infra Part V.B.
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Congress'sLack ofAttention to Key Whistleblower Considerations

After all of this examination of the theory and practice of whistleblowing, the reader
may be troubled by a lingering question: Why does OSHA, a governmental agency
focused on occupational safety, administer these financial whistleblower claims rather
than the SEC? The answer is one of historical accident rather than purposeful
congressional design. 285 And this fact underlines the lack of consideration that has
plagued legislative action regarding whistleblowing. 286
OSHA, as its name suggests, is an agency focused on workplace health and safety.
Congress foisted SOX whistleblower claims onto it without ceremony and without
apparent consideration as to whether the agency had any expertise in the area. 287 Its only
justification was that, at the time, OSHA was already administering the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act of the 21st Century 288 (AIR-21), an early federal
whistleblower-protection measure aimed at the aviation industry. 289
The original SOX bill provided full reinstatement of position, double the amount of
back pay with interest, and compensation for any "special damages sustained as a result
of the discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorney fees" in addition to the possibility of punitive damages based on the weighing
of three factors listed in the statute. 2 90 Senator Chuck Grassley thought this private cause
of action was too dangerous and introduced an amendment that forced whistleblowers to
seek relief with an agency. 291 He feared that empowering plaintiffs would "encourage[]
frivolous claims that abuse the protections we seek to bestow. 2 92 Note that Section IV's
data suggest that Senator Grassley's concern was misplaced and that, indeed, the
agency mechanism may permit more frivolous claims because the government bears the
costs of the case.
Senator Grassley urged that the protections trace the same ones afforded in the only
prior federal whistleblower statute AIR-21.293 So Congress "struck the excessive
damages included in the original bill and ... removed a provision that allowed immediate
access to federal district courts. 294 Thus, AIR-21 served as the procedural model for

285.

See supra notes 146-158.

286.

See supra notes 57-58.

287.
at 1249.

SOX claims have been described as a "bureaucratic stepchild" at OSHA. Kwok, supra note 94,

288.

49 U.S.C. § 42121.

289.

See S. REP. 107-146, at 13 (2002).

290. See S. 2010 107th Cong. § 7 (2002). Fact finders would need to take the following into account: "the
significance of the information or assistance provided by the employee . . . and the role of the employee in
advancing [the process], or in protecting the health, safety, or welfare of the employer or of the public," "the
nature and extent of both the actual and potential discrimination to which the employee was subjected," and "the
nature and extent of the risk to the health, safety, or welfare of shareholders or the public." Id.
291.

See S. REP. No. 107-146, pt. VIII-A, at 26.

292. Id.
293. See id. This SOX forbearer, incidentally, housed whistleblowing protection in OSHA-a fact that
explains why financial-fraud whistleblower protection wound up in that agency rather than the SEC. See id.
294. Id. pt. VIII-B, at 30; see also Accounting Reform and InvestorProtection:Hearingon H.R. 1088, S.
1895, S. 2010, S. 2673, H.R. 3763, and H.R. 5118 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urb. Affs., 107th
Cong.
458
(2002)
[hereinafter
Hearing
on
Accounting
Reform],
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SOX whistleblower protection. 295 Indeed, revisions to the original SOX bill specifically
sought to make protections "track" those of the aviation bill. 296 Congress reasoned,
"[b]ecause we had already extended whistleblower protections to non civil service
employees, we thought it best to track those protections as closely as possible. 2 97
Ultimately, the reason SOX whistleblowers did not have direct access to federal courts
was for the sake of consistency with a prior whistleblowing regime concerning aviation
safety.298 Note the lack of consideration that aviation safety and financial misconduct
might be different subject matter areas, with different kinds of whistleblowers, different
kinds of claims, and therefore needful of different protections.
This almost instinctual move on the part of Congress to harmonize whistleblowing
statutes reveals its lack of thought with respect to one of the central questions of this
Article: How many meritless claims are we willing to tolerate in order to reach an optimal
level of whistleblowing? Some citizens might argue that a high error rate is tolerable in
the context of airline safety, that handling ninety-nine false claims is a small price to pay
for encouraging one report of misconduct when human lives are on the line. Others might
argue that financial fraud, which impacts people's ability to survive and make a
living and can at its worst have implications for the economy of the nation as a
whole is more serious in nature. Under such a view, a high rate of false positives (i.e.,
meritless claims) for SOX whistleblowers would be acceptable.
These are hard questions, to be sure. But Congress in SOX did not even try to
address them or, indeed, appear to consider them.299 Instead, it simply conformed SOX
whistleblower protections to existing ones.300 Equally unthinkingly, on the logic of
"whistleblowing is whistleblowing," it assigned complex financial investigations to an
agency focused traditionally on the physical health and well-being of workers,3 01 even
though the SEC would have been a far more logical choice. This decision had real
costs it took years for OSHA to develop the necessary expertise to handle the technical
and complex SOX claims.3 02
This mismatch leads to this Article's most concrete policy prescription. Although
OSHA has developed expertise in the area of financial fraud, it is time to move SOX
whistleblowing out of OSHA and to the SEC. It was always an awkward housing;
OSHA's whistleblower protection office administers twenty-three statutes, and

http://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-107shrg87708/CHRG-107shrg87708
[http://penna.cc/A433-W5DR].
295.

Vaughn, supra note 46, at 8.

296.

S. REP. No. 107-146, pt. VIII-A, at 26; Hearing on Accounting Reform, supra note 294, at 2096.

297.

S. REP. No. 107-146, pt. VIII-B, at 30.

298. "However, this compromise does provide whistleblowers with access to federal court in the event
the Secretary of Labor fails to issue a final decision within 6 months." Id.
299.

See, e.g., Hearingon Accounting Reform, supra note 294, at 454.

300.

See id.; see also Vaughn, supra note 46, at 78-79.

301. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) ("The Congress declares it
to be its purpose and policy . . . to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions .... ").
302. See Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note 51, at 29-30; Meera Khan, Whistling in the Wind: Why
FederalWhistleblower ProtectionsFallShort oftheir CorporateGovernance Goals, 26 UNIv. MIAMiBUS. REV.
57, 75 (2018).
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303.
HEALTH

See DIRECTORATE OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROT. PROGRAMS (DWPP), OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
ADMIN.,

WHISTLEBLOWER

STATUTES

SUMMARY

CHART

1-11

&

twenty-two of them have nothing to do with financial fraud. 303 Instead, they concern
areas one would expect from OSHA: the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act,3 04
the Federal Railroad Safety Act,3 05 the Safe Drinking Water Act, 306 and the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 307 among others. SOX claims certainly represent the odd man
out in this group.
SOX claims have historically imposed a disproportionate burden on OSHA, 30 and
increasing demands are being placed on the agency. A recent report described how the
COVID-19 pandemic has caused a "significant increase" in the number of complaints,
an increase of thirty percent. 309 OSHA investigators are overtaxed, and this increase will
cause delays in processing workplace whistleblower claims.3 10 SOX investigations take
significantly more resources and sophistication than other OSHA investigations.3 11 It is
time to ease the burden and move these claims to a more amenable home: the SEC.
Making the transition all the smoother, the SEC already has an Office of
Whistleblower Protection, which houses the Dodd-Frank's tips. 312 That expertise could
easily expand to encompass SOX claims. By statute, ALJs hear whistleblower appeals. 313
Happily, the SEC has this apparatus already in place by virtue of its own in-house ALJs.
Another benefit of this move would be to foster a kind of information sharing that
does not seem to be happening consistently right now. The SEC is supposed to receive
copies of every SOX whistleblower complaint filed with OSHA. 314 Yet the Department
of Labor's Office of Inspector General 2015 Report found that twenty-three percent of

(2021),

http://www.wlistleblowers.gov/sites/wb/files/2021-06/Wistleblower_StatutesSummary_Chart_FINAL_6-721.pdf [http://perma.cc/XGF4-Y3B6].

§ 2651.

304.

15 U.S.C.

305.

49 U.S.C. § 20109.

306.

42 U.S.C.

307.

15 U.S.C.

§ 300j-9(i).
§ 2622.

308. See WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT, supra note 148, at
19-20 ("In our interviews, officials and investigators cited Saibanes-Oxley cases as particularly complex and
time-consuming, with different officials equating the work required for one Saibanes-Oxley case to the work
required for two to six cases under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. One official explained that
Sarbanes-Oxley cases take the longest to investigate for several reasons: investigators must learn financial
terminology; the cases tend to require more detailed, often legal, research with little case precedent; and the
employers are often large corporations that engage a larger contingent of attorneys than do employers in other
types of whistleblower cases.").
309.

U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., NO. 19-20-010-10-105, COVID 19: OSHA NEEDS TO

IMPROVE ITS HANDLING OF WHISTLEBLOWER
310.

COMPLAINTS DURING THE PANDEMIC 3 (2020).

See id.

311. See WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT, supra note 148, at
40, 44 ("Officials and supervisors told us that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the statute on which specialized legal
assistance is most often needed .... ").

312.

See 17 C.F.R.

313.

See 29 C.F.R.

§ 240.21F-9(a) (2021).
§ 1980.107 (2021).

314. See Id. § 1980.104 (2021) ("OSHA will provide an unredacted copy of [the complaint, of the
allegations contained in the complaint, and of the substance of the evidence supporting the complaint] to the
complainant (or complainant's legal counsel, if complainant is represented by counsel) and to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.").

OPTIMIZING WHISTLEBLOWING

2022]1

299

alleged violations were not reported to the agency empowered to investigate them. 15
Consolidating financial fraud reporting in a single agency would hopefully lead to
sharing of information in a manner that, as we have seen, currently is not always
occurring.
Unfortunately, moving the SOX claims out of OSHA cannot be done by
administrative action alone. Given the mandate in SOX, it would take congressional
action to make this move. Thus, this Article recommends that Congress amend SOX to
assign whistleblower complaints to the SEC rather than OSHA.
This Part detailed the lack of careful thought Congress has applied to whistleblower
protection. It explained the historical accident that housed SOX whistleblowers in OSHA
and made the case for moving them to the SEC. Having described what the SEC's Office
of the Whistleblower should be doing, it is time to turn to what that office currently is
doing and recent reforms to its workings.
B.

Recent Reforms to the SEC's Bounty Program

In 2018, the SEC proposed changes to its administration of Dodd-Frank's
whistleblower bounty system, including to the way it calculates awards. 316 These
proposals had the net effect of increasingthe odds of success for a relatively small-dollar
payout, while at the same time decreasingthe chance of a large payout. 3 17 This Part will
use a description of the proposed and final rules, and the reaction of the whistleblower
and corporate community, as another illustration of the importance of the key questions
this Article has raised.
As originally enacted, Dodd-Frank provided that if the SEC collected monetary
sanctions of over one million dollars based on the whistleblowers' information, they were
entitled to awards between 10% and 30% of the award amount.3 18 The award percentages
could increase or decrease based on several positive or negative factors. 319 The SEC's
2018 proposed reforms provided that, for awards of five million dollars or less, the
whistleblower automatically would receive the statutory maximum 300o-absent the
existence of any negative factors.3 20 The SEC justified the presumption of an award in
these cases because 75% of awards have historically been five million dollars or less.3 21

315.

OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.

DEP' T OF LAB., REPORT TO THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADMINISTRATION: OSHA NEEDS TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN ITS WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS

10
(2015),
http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2015/02-15-202-10-105.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XF7R-EGU3]. Indeed, out of a sample of thirty-one OSH Act-related regional complaints the
Office of the Inspector General reviewed, the enforcement arm of OSHA did not receive notification in ten of
them. Id. That is, in over a third of these cases, the agency did not notify its own enforcement group. OSHA
responded to the 2015 report by alleging that the Office of the Inspector General relied on inaccurate data and
ignored inter-agency correspondence to assess communication among agencies. Id. at 22.
316.

Whistleblower Program Rules, supra note 29.

317. See Amanda M. Rose, CalculatingSEC Whistleblower Awards: A TheoreticalApproach, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 2047, 2059-60 (2019).
318.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.

319. Id.
320.

Whistleblower Program Rules, supra note 29.

321.

SEC, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 33.
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Thus, whistleblowers whose reports led the government to collect around $17 million or
less would be assured of receiving 30% of that recovery.
What the SEC gave with one hand to small-dollar whistleblowers it threatened to
take away with the other, from recipients of large awards. The SEC's proposed rules
included a provision that would have given the SEC discretion to reduce an award that
netted the government monetary sanctions of at least one hundred million dollars if the
SEC found that the potential award exceeded what is "reasonably necessary to reward
the whistleblower and to incentivize other similarly situated whistleblowers." 322
Predictably, this proposed amendment stirred controversy. Recall the qualitative
data in Part III.E about the role attorneys play in these cases. Plaintiffs' attorneys
generally work on a contingency fee basis and thus favor claims that result in large dollar
verdicts either retaliation claims involving highly compensated employees or bounty
claims that have the potential to result in large collections for the government. 323 Because
attorneys claim roughly a third of any amount collected, larger awards result in higher
pay for them.
To justify large awards, attorneys are quick to point out the tremendous amount
these whistleblowers risk, not only personally but also professionally. 324 They also stress
the uniquely valuable information high earners can provide. If it is only those employees
in the C-suite who have the requisite access to high-level financial information, and such
information is precisely what is necessary to implicate financial-fraud claims, then the
government needs to incentivize and protect these executives. They are sophisticated
individuals all too aware that they risk becoming unemployable pariahs after blowing the
whistle. Considering all this, multimillion-dollar paydays do not seem so
disproportionate. After all, the annual compensation of such executives numbers in the
millions, and to blow the whistle is to risk years of unemployment.
Implicit, then, in the SEC's proposed rules was a favoring of small-dollar awards
and a disfavoring of large-dollar awards and the attorneys who make their livelihood
from them. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, supporting the
proposed rule, questioned whether awarding a whistleblower forty-five million dollars,
rather than thirty million dollars, would create any more of an incentive to come

322. Whistleblower Program Rules, supra note 29, at 11. The SEC would not, however, have the
discretion to award less than ten percent of the collected sanctions (the minimum award percentage set forth in
the statute). Id.
323.

See supra Part III.E.

324. See Loren Berlin, JPMorgan Chase Whistleblower: Essentially Suicide' To Stand Up to Bank,
HUFFPOST
(May
7,
2012,
6:41
PM),
http://www.huffpost.com/entry/linda-almonte-jpmorgan-chase-whistleblower_n_1478268
[http://perma.cc/5XHV-CUAD]; S. REP. No. 111-176, at 111 (2010) ("Recognizing that whistleblowers often
face the difficult choice between telling the truth and the risk of committing 'career suicide', the program
provides for amply rewarding whistleblower(s), with between 10% and 30% of any monetary sanctions that are
collected based on the 'original information' offered by the whistleblower."); Telephone Interview with Attorney
I (Jan. 23, 2020).
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forward.3 2 Instead, it warned that large awards create a harmful perception of "jackpot
justice. 326
But Congress did not make these kinds of value judgments in favor of small awards
at the expense of large ones when enacting SOX. Indeed, Senator Chuck Grassley
opposed the SEC's proposed amendments as running counter to the language and intent
of Dodd-Frank's whistleblowing provisions.3 27 He emphasized the importance of
high-dollar-value awards in motivating whistleblowers to come forward.3 28 Other
commenters expressed concerns that the proposed reforms could disincentivize
whistleblowers with information about massive frauds, especially those that disclose
industry-wide fraud and might be unable to work in the field after blowing the whistle. 329
Whistleblower advocates' fears may have been justified. The volume of tips coming
to the SEC declined for the first time in the history of the program in 2019, following the
announcement of the proposed rules.3 30 While we cannot make causal inferences, it at
least appears that the prospect of a higher likelihood of low awards did not encourage
more whistleblowers than the lower likelihood of high awards discouraged.
The SEC's final rules were adopted in September 2020.331 They did not include the
controversial language regarding awards over one hundred million dollars 3 3 2 so, at least
nominally, those resisting this reform won. But this was a Pyrrhic victory for
whistleblower advocates because the Commission concluded that it already had the
power to adjust large awards downwards and thus needed no change to the rules.333
This pronouncement was met with dismay. 334 Jordan Thomas, a prominent attorney
representing whistleblowers (and former SEC attorney), even sued the Commission over

325. See Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Couns., Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts.
Assoc., to Brent Fields, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to the
Whistleblower
Program
Rules
(Sept.
18,
2018),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-18/s71618-4373269-175549.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6AJ-D8CG].
326.

Id. at n.10.

327. See Letter from Charles E. Gmssley, U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,
to
the Honorable Jay
Clayton,
Chairman of the SEC
(Sept.
18, 2019),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-18/s71618-4373264-175545.pdf [http://perma.cc/9L55-87WB].
328. Id. at 2 ("Both studies concluded that 'high rewards can motivate potential whistleblowers to come
forward because the monetary amount may mitigate the cost of professional and social sanctions that can result."'
(citing U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm'n, Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits, Evaluation of the SEC's
Whistleblower
Program,
Rep.
No.
511
at
v-vi
(Jan.
18,
2013),
13 5 1
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/20
/
.pdf [http://perma.cc/7PY4-FPBQ])).
329. See, e.g., Stephen M. Kohn, Michael D. Kohn, David K. Colapinto & Sin E. Nelson, Comment
Letter on Proposed Rule To Amend to the Commission's Whistleblower Program Rules (Sept. 21, 2020),
http://www.sec.gov/comnents/s7-16-18/s71618-7797952-223596.pdf [http://perma.cc/A35Z-4KCC]; see also
Complaint, Thomas v. SEC, No. 1:21-cv-108 (Jan. 13, 2021).
330.

Broughton & Tokar, supra note 231.

331. Whistleblower
Program
Rules,
85
Fed.
Reg.
70,898
(Nov.
5,
2020),
http://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-05/pdf/2020-21444.pdf [http://perma.cc/6DUE-3KN2].

332. Id.
333. Id. at 70,914 ("[I]t is not necessary to adopt the formalized mechanism for the Commission to
exercise its discretion. . . .").
334. See, e.g., Press Release, Comn'r Allison Herring Lee, June Bug vs. Hurricane: Whistleblowers Fight
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Better
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23,
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its final rule. 335 Thomas's clients include senior executives, and his practice is
"ultra-selective." 3 3 6 Thomas argued that "[i]n reliance on the prior rules, courageous
whistleblowers have put their careers and lives on the line to assist the
Commission including wearing FBI wires, testifying in high-profile trials, and
smuggling key documents out of foreign countries." 337 His clients have recovered over
two billion dollars in monetary sanctions for the federal government, "with violators
going to jail and countless investors being protected from wrongdoing." 338 To date, his
clients have received more than $125 million, and his current clients are collectively
eligible for awards totaling over $300 million. 339 Thus, Thomas argued, large awards are
crucial to the government's mission of protecting investors.3 40
The SEC's reforms were taken in the name of efficiency. In its reports to Congress,
the OWP emphasized that the presumption for awards of five million dollars or less
"should result in gains in efficiency from streamlining the award determination
process." 3 4 1 It highlighted two other reforms "designed to help increase the
Commission's efficiency in processing whistleblower award applications. 3 4 2
But Thomas's points make plain that if efficiency is a virtue, the question of the
ultimate goal of rewarding whistleblowers is paramount in any assessment of the
efficiency of the reward mechanism. The pattern of a large number of tips leading to a
handful of awards described in Part IV.A and an average success rate of 0.2 8%-is
quite arresting. Indeed, it may be the sign of a real problem and serve as evidence that
risks overloading the system." 343
"[p]roviding too many incentives or protections ...
Overwhelming the system does not just create increased administration costs. More
troublingly, it also requires an overburdened agency "to focus efforts on a subset of tips,
or else allocate fewer investigative resources to each, thus degrading the accuracy of its
screening efforts." 344 Thus, swamping the system with a surfeit of tips may cause a
"perverse result" where it is less likely that misconduct is reduced, and therefore "more
whistleblowing may actually yield less overall deterrence. 3 45

("The principal reason that I find myself unable to support this rule is because of the treatment given to the
central issue of the Commission's discretion to consider the dollar amount of an award in making award
determinations.").
335. Complaint ¶ 12, Thomas v. SEC, No. 1:21-cv-108 (D.D.C. Jan.
13, 2021),
http://www. secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Thomas-Complaint-Jan-I3-final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D2DE-RL4X].
336. Id. ¶ 23. "Every year [Thomas'] team screens more than 300 potential cases, but he typically accepts
fewer than 12 as clients." Id.
337.

Id. ¶ 10.

338.

Id. ¶35.

339.

Id. ¶¶33-34.

340.
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342. Id. The first barred applicants from seeking awards if they had submitted three frivolous award
applications previously. See id. The second provides a simplified procedure for dealing with certain common
while freeing up staff resources to focus on
types of denials, "to help facilitate a more timely resolution ...
processing potentially meritorious award claims." Id.
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But it is hard to say from the outside whether the SEC's Office of the Whistleblower
is in fact swamped by the thousands of tips it receives each year. For all the thousands
of tips the SEC receives, it refers relatively few of them for investigation.3 46 Perhaps the
information the SEC receives is worth the costs of some claims that lack merit. Perhaps
many of the tips result in government recoveries under one million dollars, and thus result
in no awards. Perhaps the government is exercising its discretion aggressively and not
awarding awards even when tips aid in recovery. Indeed, perhaps the unspoken truth of
the bounty program is that it amounts to little more than a lottery: the government gains
a high volume of valuable information from tippers seeking a large payout and must pay
an award for only a fraction of those tips. In some sense, such a result might be an
inefficiency but an inefficiency that works decidedly in the government's favor.
More data from the SEC would be helpful data about how useful the tips they
receive are, even those that do not lead to a monetary recovery of over one million
dollars. Information about how many tips are screened out quickly, and if there are ways
to decrease the number of frivolous tips, would also be helpful.3 4 7 How many tips lack
merit? How many lead to the revelation of small dollar fraud? How many help with the
government's investigation, but not enough to merit award? These are just a few
questions that could shed light on the important policy questions regarding the value of
small- versus large-dollar awards.
But the SEC's data can only tell us so much. Ultimately, these are judgment calls.
We need to decide how important information about financial fraud is to our society.
And how many nonmeritorious tips how much inefficiency we are willing to stomach
in order to ferret out financial wrongdoing. Further, we have to decide whether we are
concerned enough about large dollar financial fraud to award already wealthy
individuals and their lawyers over thirty or even fifty million dollars if they aid in a
large government recovery. In the debate about reforming the system, the Commission
and whistleblower advocates are largely talking past each other. The SEC's reforms, and
the reaction to them, thus highlight the contribution of this Article.
C.

ProposedAnalytic Framework

Now it is time to pull back and apply what we have learned. The Article's first
contribution was to move analysis beyond reflexive characterization of whistleblowing
as an unalloyed good. The theory and background Sections made clear the multiplicity
of design paths that legislators can take. Section IV offered a deep dive into the only
evidence we have, at least in the context of U.S. financial fraud. The prior Parts in this
Section illustrated the paucity of current legislative and agency thinking about the
inevitable tradeoffs that whistleblowing policy presents, and made one policy
prescription: to turn protection for financial-fraud whistleblowers wholly over to the
SEC.
As we have seen, with respect to whistleblowing in the financial fraud context,
Congress has been largely reactive.34 8 SOX, driven by the experience of internal

346.

See Baer, supra note 49, at 2227.

347. Indeed, one of the SEC's reforms formalized a ban on tippers who have filed three or more frivolous
tips. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(e)(1) (2021).
348.

See supra notes 282-283.
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whistleblowers Watkins (Enron) and Cooper (WorldCom), focused on creating an
agency response that was modeled after whistleblowing in the aviation industry-apples
and oranges if ever there were any.3 49 Dodd-Frank focused on the failure of the SEC to
heed the tip of external whistleblower Markopolos in the Bernie Madoff fraud. 350 It
therefore created a direct cause of action and a separate bounty system to incentivize
reporting misconduct. In neither case did Congress consider the central questions of this
Article.
Congress thus still has hard questions to answer, should it have the political will to
do so, about what kinds of reporting the law should incentivize, and what rate of false
positives (i.e., meritless claims) and false negatives (i.e., unblown whistles) society is
willing to tolerate to generate that reporting.
There is also the undeniable fact that parties blow the whistle, just as they bargain,
in the shadow of the law. Employees will report fraud, or stay silent, based on the
protection afforded to them, and employers will negotiate prelitigation against the
backdrop of the law. So the reach of these whistleblower protections extends
beyond perhaps far beyond the actual cases and complaints filed to these prelitigation
settings where the law on the books casts a considerable shadow indeed.
Faced with these competing considerations, Congress has to determine the optimal
amount of whistleblowing protection a complicated question. In the specific context of
financial fraud, the question is how much of an incentive there should be for reporting
fraud that could result in government recovery amounting to hundreds of millions or even
billions of dollars. It might be that society has an interest in maximizing all reporting of
misconduct, at whatever cost in false reporting. I reject this view; any sensible regime
must incentivize true reporting while at least acknowledging the risk of false claims and
trying to mitigate it. But then the question becomes how to mitigate, and what factors to
consider in crafting whistleblower protection.
This Part creates a framework for thinking about the broader questions. That
framework consists of a two-stage analysis. This framework is perforce general, but it
creates a formal structure for applying the insights of the Article. The first stage considers
the nature of the underlying harm. The second stage weighs the merits of various
mechanisms of incentive, deterrence, and remedy.
1.

Stage One

The first step is to evaluate the immediate harm the misconduct poses. Is it a matter
of life and death, as in the aviation or health care context? Do economic losses amount
to millions of dollars? This step is concerned with evaluating the severity of the harm.
While these questions can be difficult (How does financial well-being compare in
importance to physical health? What makes one harm worse than another?) they are
crucial to a principled analysis of how to address misconduct.
Second, but relatedly, Congress should consider whether the misconduct has
systemic implications. For example, to circle back to the aviation industry, there would
have been systemic implications to a whistleblowing that revealed the problems with
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See Senate Hearing Statement of Harry Markopolos, supra note 31.
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Boeing's MAX 737 airplane. Problems with the software resulted in hundreds of planes
globally being grounded.35 1 Similarly, fraud in financial institutions or in data privacy
might have far-reaching implications and be worthy of enhanced whistleblower
protection or encouragement. This question addresses the number of individuals affected,
not the severity of the harm.
Third, Congress should consider what kinds of whistleblowers would be likely to
report misconduct senior-level or more frontline employees. If high-level accounting
fraud is the concern, then senior-level employees might be more likely whistleblowers.
If, on the other hand, low-level employees are likely to be eyewitnesses to misconduct,
a different remedy may be in order. The next stage will discuss the remedy question, but
to preview in brief, reliance on back pay is a limitation of any antiretaliation model.
Fourth, Congress must reflect on the likelihood of false claims and the burden that
such claims will impose on defendants. Some misconduct may be more straightforward
and thus harder to falsify. Other misconduct, or other industries, might involve more gray
areas that render it more difficult to ascribe fault. Indeed, some of these claims may not
be nuisance suits, but rather be brought by plaintiffs who lack a good understanding of
what their rights and protections are under the law. Education as to exactly what the law
requires is crucial in such cases. But education is no cure-all. Ex-employees are often
angry with their former employers after having been let go, and revenge is a problematic
nonpecuniary motive for whistleblowing. 5 2
2.

Stage Two

From a consideration of the underlying misconduct, Congress should then move to
the question of remedies and deterrence. This Article has provided data, both quantitative
and qualitative, on several of the various levers available to address these questions. This
Part offers only brief reflections.
The first choice is whether to provide a bounty or antiretaliation protection.
Bounties are affirmative incentives to blow the whistle. This incentive works regardless
of a worker's salary or whether they were punished for blowing the whistle. The goal is
to incentivize the reporting itself. Part IV.A described the OWP bounty program at the
SEC, showing that such incentives can be powerful, generating hundreds of tips for every
actual payout. These positive incentives, however, naturally drive up the risk of spurious
tips. 35 3 On the other hand, the salience of even relatively few high-profile awards may
351. Lea Desrayaud, Basile Simon & Michael Ovaska, The Grounded 737 MAX Fleet, REUTERS
GRAPHICS (Mar. 14, 2019), http://graphics.reuters.com/ETHIOPIA-AIRPLANE/010091341G7/index.html
[http://perma.cc/GX9E-9PCF].
352. See Casey & Niblett, supra note 92, at 1209 ("A terminated employee may be happy to see her
employer punished regardless of whether the employer committed any fraud.").
353.

See Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World As We Know It, or
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Act's Whistleblower Provision, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN L. 1023, 1041 (2012) ("[T]he race to report may
encourage employees to rush to the SEC with unreliable and frivolous claims."); see also Jenny Lee, Corporate
Corruption & the New Gold Mine: How the Dodd-FrankAct Overincentivizes Whistleblowing, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 303, 314 (2011) ("Despite legislators' good intentions, the Dodd-Frank Act's bounty program
overincentivizes whistleblowing and will waste administrative resources because it provides what studies show
are unnecessarily excessive awards. Although the bounty program was enacted to encourage whistleblowing,
the monetary rewards are likely unnecessary in advancing the provision's purported goals. Further, the bounty
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not only encourage whistleblowers but also improve morale and motivation for
investigators themselves.35 4
The other choice is to provide antiretaliation protection. This approach is less direct
than a bounty system. It does not directly encourage whistleblowing, but instead makes
whistleblowing easier for employees by deterring an impediment to reporting
misconduct. This choice thus hinges on whether policymakers believe people will
naturally want to report misconduct and need only be protected from retaliation, or need
to be spurred to do the right thing. Feldman and Lobel's experimental research, discussed
in Part II.D, suggests antiretaliation protection is a better motivator for whistleblowers,
but the question remains an open one.
Beyond the motivational question, there are two potential problems with
implementing an antiretaliation approach. First, this measure disproportionately rewards
plaintiffs with high salaries. That is, a whistleblower's antiretaliation claim, because of
its compensatory model, will by definition give higher rewards to relatively well-heeled
employees. Attorneys who largely work on contingency fees and drive these claims will
be more attracted to C-suite or other high-level employees.355 Lower-level
whistleblowers who are punished for reporting misconduct will not find an attorney
champion that is, unless they have a colorable claim to a Dodd-Frank whistleblower
bounty and can convince an attorney to join the thousands of tipsters vying for a chance
at a payout.3 56 This base inequity is troubling, especially when one considers that
high-income employees likely have a greater financial cushion than their low-earning
whistleblowing counterparts.
Second, a back pay award is calculated from the time that an employee suffered
adverse employment action through date of judgment. As every first-year law student
learns, however, the employee has the duty to mitigate by finding other employment. In
a tight labor market, an employee might find work very quickly after being terminated.
Thus, an employee could have a strong case on the merits, but obtain a mitigating job
two weeks after termination and wind up with an amount of damages so low that there
is no incentive to pursue the case even if the employee is highly compensated.
Third, Congress should consider the remedy it provides to whistleblowers.
Dodd-Frank offers double back pay, whereas SOX does not. One interviewee described
SOX's damages as "weak and tepid" and "a joke. 357 If Congress is concerned about
retaliation against low earners-either for reasons of equity or because it believes them
to be more likely to be on the front lines of witnessing violations it could increase the
damages to a multiple of the whistleblower's salary. Minimum antiretaliation awards, or
multiple damages awards up to a certain amount ($100,000? $150,000?), might also do
the trick. Yet, such awards could also encourage more frivolous claims.
The data make clear that both regimes generate a substantial percentage of
unsuccessful claims. The proportion of these that are sincere but mistaken, as opposed to

provisions lack significant threshold considerations and fail to discourage the submission of frivolous claims.
As a result, whistleblowers are overincentivized.").
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malicious, is unclear. The prospect of a higher damages award will undoubtedly spur
more of the latter kind of claimants. Whether such a risk is worth running depends on
the calculus outlined in the first stage of the framework.
Fourth, Congress should consider the merits of confidentiality versus public
exposure of wrongdoing. Corporate defendants generally will want to keep their names
from being associated either with misconduct and/or with retaliating against
whistleblowers. Similarly, whistleblowers may be reluctant to go public for
economically rational reasons. They risk becoming "pariahs" who will not be able to find
work in the industry again if they are known as whistleblowers. 38
The risk of revenge-motivated whistleblowing is relatively smaller in the
administrative-agency context, where the interpolation of an in-house investigator means
that the innocent employer will face relatively little publicity and disruption, at least until
appeal. We know the details of Ms. Petitt, the Delta whistleblower described in the
Introduction, because her case had moved past the confidential-investigation stage and
the ALJ issued an opinion on appeal. In the Dodd-Frank antiretaliation context, however,
a suit will be public as soon as it is filed. The costs of such revenge litigation are thus far
higher. Employers are forced to defend a lawsuit, entailing attorneys' costs, distraction,
and a diversion of resources. Thus, agency-based actions may be more appealing if we
wish to safeguard against employers being harmed by revenge-motivated claims.
At the same time, public naming and shaming of corporate bad actors plays an
important role in future deterrence. 35 9 The public does, after all, have an interest in
knowing that retaliation against whistleblowers will be punished. 360 Knowledge of the
existence of protection will embolden future whistleblowers to speak out.
Relatedly, Congress should consider whether it wants to incentivize internal versus
external reporting. SOX protects whistleblowers from retaliation whether they report
misconduct within the organization or to an outside agency. 361 Dodd-Frank, after Digital
Realty Trust, only protects whistleblowers who have reported to the SEC. 362 This means
a well-advised whistleblower will bypass any corporate mechanisms set up to address
misconduct internally in favor of going straight to the SEC. It also means that sincere
and meritorious whistleblowers who report internally and are fired for their scruples face
a "gotcha" situation: they must report to the SEC after being fired or have no redress for
the retaliation they have suffered because they went through their organization's internal
channels. Creating this incentive to report externally may be sound policy, depending on
the nature of the concerns regarding the underlying harm, but there are countervailing
reasons for giving corporations a chance to resolve matters first.
Fifth, Congress should consider which institution should provide plaintiffs
recourse. A claimant can file with an agency relatively easily. After a claimant files with
OSHA, they then face an interview, but few real upfront costs as the investigation plays
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out.3 63 Conversely, the court model creates higher barriers to entry. Imposing costs on
litigants and their lawyers lessens the burden on the public in terms of costs, but
correspondingly imposes more of a burden on would-be whistleblowers themselves.
One additional justification for using an agency mechanism is that agencies can
employ their specialized expertise in handling whistleblower cases. Of course, choice of
agency matters. Locating whistleblowing reporting in an agency with subject-matter
expertise is essential. If whistleblowing is housed in the appropriate agency, that shared
location gives the agency notification of potential violations in enforcement proceedings.
This informational benefit plausible in theory-in practice is now going somewhat
unfulfilled, as we saw in Part V.B. 3 64 Nevertheless, government notification of
wrongdoing remains a theoretical consideration when choosing between an agency and
the court system.
In sum, this Part has sketched out a framework for legislators interested in
answering the fundamental questions regarding whistleblower policy. There is more
work to be done in analyzing the important considerations in the framework. This Article
has merely attempted to open that conversation.
CONCLUSION

How much whistleblowing is optimal? And how many meritless claims are we
willing to tolerate in order to reach that optimal level? So far, we have no equivalent of
Blackstone's ratio in whistleblowing. We may well reckon as a society that protecting
one true whistleblower is worth the cost of assessing nine, or ninety-nine, mistaken or
false claims.
Whistleblowers play an important role in society, but current whistleblower
protection policy is haphazard at best and miscalibrated at worst. The main contributions
of this Article are its articulation of the crucial questions at the heart of the current
system's failings, its showing in granular detail with empirical data how three real-world
whistleblowing regimes work, and its presentation of a framework for thinking through
them. The Article describes the shortcomings of housing SOX whistleblowers at OSHA,
and advocates for moving that whistleblowing apparatus into its rightful home in the
SEC. Finally, it provides a framework for asking hard questions about how we should
structure whistleblower law to maximize the benefits it provides while minimizing its
costs.
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APPENDIX A:

DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE 15 U.S.C.

§ 78U-6

CODEBOOK

LexisNexis Research Path
1. In LexisNexis, search "15 U.S.C. sec. 78u-6"
2. Select "Shepardize this document" (as of 11/9/16, 138 cases cite to the statute)
3. Adjust the "Sort by" filter to "Date (newest-oldest)"
4. Open each case and read in order to gather the following information to input
into Excel Spreadsheet:
Information Inputted Into Excel Spreadsheet
Case Name: Copy and paste from case
Case Citation: Copy and paste from case (either LN or National Reporter)
Is case applicable to research question?
Y=Yes
N = No
If inapplicable, why?
NDF = Not a Dodd-Frank claim
NER = No employment relationship
PAD = Parties agreed to dismiss Dodd-Frank claim
NSMJ = Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
CND = Dodd-Frank claim not discussed (because other preliminary motions at
issue)
Decision Date (provided under case name): Copy and paste from case
Court:
ST = State Court
D = District Court
1C = First Circuit
2C = Second Circuit
3 C = Third Circuit
4C = Fourth Circuit
5C = Fifth Circuit
6C = Sixth Circuit
7C = Seventh Circuit
8C = Eighth Circuit
9C = Ninth Circuit
10C = Tenth Circuit
11C = Eleventh Circuit
DCC = District of Columbia Circuit
SCOTUS = Supreme Court of the United States
Judge's Name: Copy and paste from case
Employer: Copy and paste from case
Claimant's Last Name: Copy and paste from case
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Claimant's First Name: Copy and paste from case
Claimant's Gender:
M = Male
F = Female
Method of Proof of Gender:
OP = Evidence given in the opinion
CONV = Conventional names
OR = Outside research, such as Googling the person's name
Claimant Represented by Attorney? (provided in case on LexisNexis or look to
original complaint)
Y=Yes
N = No
U = Unknown
Amicus curiae? (provided in case on LexisNexis)
Y=Yes
N = No
If Yes, what agency?
SEC = Securities & Exchange Commission
DOL = United States Department of Labor
U = Unknown
Disposition of lawsuit as a whole:
D = Dismissed
P = Case proceeds
Disposition of Claimant's Dodd-Frank claim:
D = Dismissed
P = Case proceeds
If dismissed/withdrawn in favor of Defendant, why?
IE = Insufficient evidence
SOL = Statute of limitations
IP = Issue preclusion
RET = Claim dismissed because Dodd-Frank does not apply retroactively
NWB = Claimant did not qualify as a "whistleblower" under the statute
because failed to report to SEC
ARB = Parties must arbitrate instead
EEP = Employee terminated because of his/her substandard performance
RNA = The type of relief claimant seeks is not available under Dodd-Frank
language
EXT = The antiretaliation provision of Dodd-Frank does not apply
extraterritorially
FSC = Failure to state a claim under Dodd-Frank
NSMJ = Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
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Other claims brought in suit?
Y=Yes
N = No
U = Unknown
If Yes, what are other claims brought?
SLC = State statutory law claims and/or common law claims
ERA = Energy Reorganization Act
SOX = Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SEA = Securities Exchange Act of 1934
FMLA = Family Medical Leave Act
FCPA = Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
ADA = Americans with Disabilities Act
ADEA = Age Discrimination in Employment Act
SCA = Stored Communications Act
CR = Civil rights violations
SAA = Sherman Antitrust Act
FCA = False Claims Act
FLSA = Fair Labor Standards Act
ERISA = The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
RICO = Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
Did Claimant receive award?
Y=Yes
N = No
U = Unknown
If award, dollar amount: Copy and paste from case
If award, from what cause of action is the award amount?
Did SEC find fraud? (Other reference to underlying merit?)
Y=Yes
N = No
U = Unknown
If yes, case citation: Copy and paste from case
Notes:
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